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  INTRODUCTION   
While often overlooked, footnotes occasionally foreshadow 
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groundbreaking legal revolutions.1 No better example exists 
than the celebrated footnote four of United States v. Carolene 
Products Co.2 Emerging from “below the line,” footnote four re-
oriented the Supreme Court’s approach to Equal Protection 
Clause jurisprudence, isolating “discrete and insular minori-
ties” as the building block for what would later become the 
Court’s suspect classification doctrine.3
Identifying such path-breaking footnotes all too frequently 
requires making sense of the doctrinal tea leaves, especially 
given the uncertain importance granted propositions of law 
buried beneath the text. But in the Supreme Court’s recent de-
cision Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC, a new footnote four makes a 
bold assertion—holding that the “ministerial exception” serves 
as an affirmative defense as opposed to a jurisdictional bar
 
4—
that rests on a radically new conception of the relationship be-
tween church and state, gesturing towards an increasingly 
symbiotic relationship between religious institutions and civil 
courts.5
By contrast and for some years, a wide range of scholars on 
both sides of the political spectrum had conceptualized the rela-





 1. See J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 275, 293–94 (1989). 
For more critical assessments of the proliferation of footnotes generally, see 
Arthur D. Austin, Footnotes as Product Differentiation, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1131 
(1987); Abner J. Mikva, Goodbye to Footnotes, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 647 (1985). 
 That is, scholars converged on the view that the 
 2. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 3. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 75–77 (1980); Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Ac-
tivism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1289–91 (1982); see 
also Dan T. Coenen, The Future of Footnote Four, 41 GA. L. REV. 797, 798 
(2007) (“The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Carolene Products 
Co. generated the most famous footnote—and perhaps the most famous pas-
sage—in all of the American Judiciary’s treatment of constitutional law.”); 
Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 758 (2011) 
(noting that footnote four of Carolene Products is “[v]iewed by many as the 
fountainhead of the heightened scrutiny framework for minority groups”).  
 4. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. 
Ct. 694, 709 n.4 (2012) (“We conclude that the exception operates as an af-
firmative defense to an otherwise cognizable claim, not a jurisdictional bar.”). 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. See infra notes 65–67. I do not here reference the debates over wheth-
er and to what extent the Establishment Clause was aimed at the relative au-
thority of state and federal government over religion. For examples of scholars 
addressing this issue, see AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 32–42 
(1998); PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 101–07 
(2002); Kent Greenawalt, Common Sense About Original and Subsequent Un-
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religion clauses deprived courts of subject-matter jurisdiction 
over religious claims such as religious defamation,7 religious 
employment,8 communal shunning,9 clergy malpractice,10 and 
religious contracts.11 Placing increasing emphasis on the Estab-
lishment Clause, a growing number of scholars argued that 
claims implicating “questions of discipline, or of faith, or eccle-
siastical rule, custom, or law”12
The jurisdictional approach to the religion clauses found 
champions among scholars advocating for a robust “church au-
tonomy doctrine,” which provided religious institutions with a 
right to direct their own internal affairs free from government 
 were properly within the sole 
province of religious institutions.  
 
derstandings of the Religion Clauses, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 479 (2006); Douglas 
Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liber-
ty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155 
(2004); Steven D. Smith, The Jurisdictional Establishment Clause: A Reap-
praisal, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1843 (2006). 
 7. See, e.g., Klagsbrun v. Va’ad Harabonim, 53 F. Supp. 2d 732, 734 
(D.N.J. 1999); Farley v. Wis. Evangelical Lutheran Synod, 821 F. Supp. 1286, 
1288 (D. Minn. 1993); Goodman v. Temple Shir Ami Inc., 712 So. 2d 775, 776–
77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Downs v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Balt., 
683 A.2d 808, 813 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996); Abdelhak v. Jewish Press Inc., 
985 A.2d 197, 200 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009). 
 8. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 705 (noting uniform acceptance 
of the ministerial exception by federal courts of appeals); Alcazar v. Corp. of 
the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288, 1290 (9th Cir. 2010); Bryce 
v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 655 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 9. Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875, 
881 (9th Cir. 1987); Burgess v. Rock Creek Baptist Church, 734 F. Supp. 30, 
34 (D.D.C. 1990); Sands v. Living Word Fellowship, 34 P.3d 955, 959 (Alaska 
2001); Anderson v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., No. M2004-
01066-COA-R9-CV, 2007 WL 161035, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2007); see 
also Justin K. Miller, Comment, Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don’t: Re-
ligious Shunning and the Free Exercise Clause, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 271, 272 
(1988). 
 10. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); 
Nally v. Grace Comm. Church, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97, 103 (1988); Wisniewski v. 
Diocese of Belleville, 943 N.E.2d 43, 75 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011); H.R.B. v. J.L.G., 
913 S.W.2d 92, 98 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 703 
(N.J. 1997); Jones v. Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927, 930 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992); White 
v. Blackburn, 787 P.2d 1315, 1318–19 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
 11. See, e.g., Sieger v. Sieger, 747 N.Y.S.2d 102, 104–05 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2002); Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). 
 12. Ogle v. Hocker, 279 F. App’x 391, 395 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Watson 
v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1871)); Bryce, 289 F.3d at 655 (“This 
church autonomy doctrine prohibits civil court review of internal church dis-
putes involving matters of faith, doctrine, church governance, and polity.”); see 
also Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 205 (2d Cir. 2008); Minker v. Balt. 
Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1357 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990). 
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interference.13 On such an account, the Establishment Clause 
instructed courts to stay out of religious disputes for fear of en-
croaching on the jurisdiction of religious institutions. Propo-
nents of this vision of “dual jurisdictions” emphasize the im-
portant values promoted by a jurisdictional approach to the 
relationship between church and state: the limited authority of 
the state14 and the free development of religious life.15
Ironically, the jurisdictional approach to the relationship 
between church and state also resonated with scholars who ex-
plicitly rejected the claim that “religious institutions are pre-
sumptively autonomous.”
 Thus, by 
granting religious institutions sole authority over matters of re-
ligious doctrine, discipline and governance, the state recognizes 
the independent autonomy of religious institutions and pro-




 13. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg et al., Religious Freedom, Church-State Sep-
aration, and the Ministerial Exception, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 175, 175 
(2011); Thomas C. Berg, Religious Organizational Freedom and Conditions on 
Government Benefits, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 165, 177 (2009); Carl H. 
Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental 
Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1998); Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Mat-
ter? Towards an Institutional Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. 
L. REV. 273, 288 (2008); Paul Horwitz, Act III of the Ministerial Exception, 106 
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 156, 161–62 (2011) [hereinafter Horwitz, Act III]; 
Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and 
Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 87 (2009) [hereinafter Horwitz, 
Churches as First Amendment Institutions]; Gregory A. Kalscheur, Civil Pro-
cedure and the Establishment Clause: Exploring the Ministerial Exception, 
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, and the Freedom of the Church, 17 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 43, 48–49 (2008); Nelson Tebbe, Nonbelievers, 97 VA. L. REV. 
1111, 1167 (2011).  
 Thus, Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle 
argued that courts are constitutionally prohibited from adjudi-
 14. See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 13, at 67 (“[R]eligions that point to a 
transcendent authority help check the power of the modern nation-state. This 
is because such religions refuse to recognize the state‘s sovereignty as abso-
lute.”); Kalscheur, supra note 13, at 91–96 (describing how conceptualizing the 
ministerial exception as jurisdictional reaffirms the “penultimacy of the 
state”). 
 15. See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 13, at 63 (“Rather, the aim of the Clause 
is for government to avoid activities that harm the integrity of religion 
(religare) or religious organizations (the ekklesia).”); Horwitz, Churches as 
First Amendment Institutions, supra note 13, at 114 (concluding that under “a 
sphere sovereignty approach to religious entities,” religious institutions 
“would coexist alongside the state . . . serving a vital role in furthering self-
fulfillment, the development of a religious community, and the development of 
public discourse”).  
 16. Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Enti-
ties in Our Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37, 78–79 (2002). 
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cating religious claims not because of some constitutional de-
sire to “systematically protect the interests of certain classes of 
parties, defined by religious mission.”17 Instead, the Establish-
ment Clause imposes a jurisdictional bar on judicial resolution 
of religious claims because such “claims would require courts to 
answer questions that the state is not competent to address.”18 
Accordingly, courts cannot interfere in such matters on a theo-
ry of “adjudicative disability”—the state simply has “limited ju-
risprudential competence” to decide such religious matters.19
Notwithstanding the conflicting theoretical underpin-
nings—one focused on the freedom of religious institutions and 
the other on the adjudicative disability of courts—both groups 
agreed that courts lacked the necessary subject-matter jurisdic-
tion to resolve claims implicating religious matters. Such an 
approach has important and practical implications. Most nota-
bly, if courts are jurisdictionally barred from adjudicating reli-
gious claims, then courts can and must raise such constitution-
al worries sua sponte, irrespective of whether the parties raise 
them.
  
20 For example, if a minister brings suit against a reli-
gious institution for violating employment discrimination stat-
utes, the court must raise the “ministerial exception” defense 
regardless of whether the religious institution does so.21
This would be true even if both parties want a court to re-
solve a dispute—maybe on account that the dispute is simply 
too intractable to resolve within the institution’s own adjudica-
tive framework. Put differently, religious institutions cannot 
prevent courts from dismissing religious claims on constitu-
tional grounds—that is, they cannot waive such claims—
because the constitutional restrictions on judicial resolution of 
religious claims are not rights to be asserted by the religious 
institution;
  
22 they are jurisdictional limitations on what a court 
can do.23
 
 17. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations: 
Disputes Between Religious Institutions and Their Leaders, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 119, 122 (2009). 
 
 18. Id. at 138; see also Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct 
and Ecclesiastical Immunity, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1789, 1815.  
 19. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 17, at 123. 
 20. See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural 
Restraint: Validations and Ramifications, 18 J.L. & POL. 445, 455 (2002) 
(“[R]ights, because they are personal, can be waived by the rights-holder. 
Whereas structure, because it is there to benefit the entire body politic, cannot 
be waived.”). 
 21. See Horwitz, Act III, supra note 13, at 161–62. 
 22. Esbeck, supra note 13, at 58 n.236 (“A free exercise right could be 
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Indeed, this approach to church-state relations made quite 
a lot of sense in the wake of Employment Division v. Smith. In 
Smith, the Supreme Court held that individuals had no free ex-
ercise right of accommodation from facially neutral and gener-
ally applicable laws.24 Such a holding appeared to undermine 
doctrines like the ministerial exception: If the Free Exercise 
Clause did not require accommodation of religious practices 
otherwise prohibited by facially neutral and generally applica-
ble laws, then why should the constitution shield religious in-
stitutions from liability under employment discrimination stat-
utes when such statutes were undeniably facially neutral and 
generally applicable?25
A jurisdictional approach provided a very easy answer. The 
Free Exercise Clause requires accommodation of neither indi-
viduals nor institutions.
  
26 However, the Establishment Clause 
does deprive courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over claims 
that implicate religious doctrine, practice, discipline and gov-
ernance.27 This is a limitation on judicial authority—not a right 
granted to religious institutions.28
However, this jurisdictional picture of judicial authority 
and institutional autonomy came undone somewhat abruptly in 
footnote four of Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC. In Hosanna-Tabor, 
the Court affirmed the ministerial exception, which exempts re-
  
 
waived by the claimant. But if the operative principle is a constitutional limit 
on the Court’s power, then the objection to judicial inquiry into religious doc-
trine cannot be waived. Thus, it can be inferred that the rule of law in these 
cases is structural in origin.”); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 18, at 1815 (“Reli-
gious entities cannot waive this jurisdictional limitation, which we believe re-
sides most comfortably in the Establishment Clause (even as it furthers Free 
Exercise values).”).  
 23. See generally Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Proce-
dure: Thoughts on a Trichotomy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1547, 1547–48 (2008) (de-
scribing the conventional view of the merits/jurisdiction distinction). 
 24. Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 
(1990). 
 25. See Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: 
The Surprising Lessons of Smith, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1633, 1654 (noting the 
need for courts to shift the rationale underpinning the ministerial exception 
post-Employment Division v. Smith); Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institu-
tions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and the Public Good, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1099, 
1194–95 (“In those jurisdictions that recognize the ministerial exception, it is 
unlikely to be reversed in the near future, but it is in tension with the Court’s 
most recent cases clarifying the Free Exercise Clause.”).  
 26. See infra Part I.B. 
 27. See infra Part I.B.  
 28. See infra Part I.B.; see also Esbeck, supra note 13, at 3–4; Lupu & 
Tuttle, supra note 17, at 122.  
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ligious institutions from complying with various employment 
statutes in the hiring and firing of “ministers.”29 Accordingly, 
much of the subsequent commentary has focused on Hosanna-
Tabor as a resounding victory for religious liberty.30 But the 
Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor did more than simply en-
dorse the ministerial exception. Despite the lack of briefing by 
the parties,31 footnote four of the Supreme Court’s decision re-
solved a split among the federal courts of appeals32
A conflict has arisen in the Courts of Appeals over whether the minis-
terial exception is a jurisdictional bar or a defense on the mer-
its. . . . We conclude that the exception operates as an affirmative de-
fense to an otherwise cognizable claim, not a jurisdictional bar. That 
is because the issue presented by the exception is “whether the alle-
gations the plaintiff makes entitle him to relief,” not whether the 
court has “power to hear [the] case.”
 and held the 
following:  
33





 29. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. 
Ct. 694, 706 (2012) (“We agree that there is such a ministerial exception.”). 
 For a doctrine to serve as a jurisdictional bar, it must 
 30. See, e.g., Richard Garnett, A Win for Religious Freedom, NAT’L REV. 
ONLINE (Jan. 11, 2012, 12:21 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench 
-memos/287858/win-religious-freedom-richard-garnett; Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, Hosanna in the Highest!, PUB. DISCOURSE (Jan. 13, 2012), http:// 
www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/01/4541.  
 31. Howard M. Wasserman, Prescriptive Jurisdiction, Adjudicative Juris-
diction, and the Ministerial Exemption, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 289, 
308, 310 (2012).  
 32. Compare Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225 (6th 
Cir. 2007), abrogated by Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709 n.4 (characterizing 
the ministerial exception as jurisdictional), and Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of 
Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1038 (7th Cir. 2006), abrogated by Hosanna-Tabor, 132 
S. Ct. at 709 n.4 (same), with Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (characterizing the ministerial exception as an affirmative defense), 
and Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 654 (10th 
Cir. 2002) (same), and Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 
940, 951 (9th Cir. 1999) (same), and Natal v. Christian & Missionary Alliance, 
878 F.2d 1575, 1576 (1st Cir. 1989) (same). 
 33. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709 n.4 (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. 
Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010)).  
 34. In an important article, Howard Wasserman has argued that as a 
matter of civil procedure the ministerial exception must be considered an af-
firmative defense. See Wasserman, supra note 31, at 304. Wasserman reaches 
this conclusion because on his view that the ministerial exception “arises not 
from an absence of core adjudicative power, but from an absence of existing 
legal rules to be applied and enforced, which in turn arises from an absence of 
prescriptive authority to enact those rules.” Id. If true, then footnote four of 
Hosanna-Tabor fits into a larger civil procedure narrative and does not signal 
a rejection of the prevailing jurisdictional view of the relationship between 
church and state. While Wasserman’s claims identify how Hosanna-Tabor fits 
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serve to circumscribe “the court’s raw, baseline power and legit-
imate authority to hear and resolve the legal and factual is-
sues” being presented.35 By contrast, for a doctrine to serve as 
an affirmative defense, it must speak to the merits of the claim, 
contesting whether the defendant’s “real-world conduct” can 
provide “a basis for suit” or a basis for legal liability.36
Thus, by conceptualizing the ministerial exception as an 
affirmative defense, the Court implicitly rejected the jurisdic-
tional approach to judicial intervention in cases implicating re-
ligious matters. Instead of viewing the ministerial exception as 
 
 
into a larger civil procedure narrative, they seem to rest on a contestable view 
of the ministerial exception. According to Wasserman, the ministerial excep-
tion speaks to the merits of a claim because it is premised on a “regulatory 
disability” whereby “government institutions, especially legislatures, are disa-
bled from enacting legal rules that regulate particular real-world conduct and 
actors.” Id. at 303. Wasserman further contends that the ministerial exception 
cannot be jurisdictional because it is not, first and foremost, related to the ad-
judicative disability of courts. Instead, he contends that “the limitation on ju-
dicial decisionmaking is incidental to the broader limitation on legislative 
power and on the reach and scope of the substantive law Congress can enact.” 
Id. at 304. It is not clear why this must be the case. In fact, it is precisely this 
claim that scholars have contested when arguing that the Establishment 
Clause is structural, Esbeck, supra note 13, at 2–11, and premised on an adju-
dicative disability, Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 17, at 134–39. Indeed, according 
to such scholars, the ministerial exception is not merely incidental to “the lim-
itation on judicial decisionmaking,” but is directly linked to the adjudicative 
disability of courts to resolve such claims. And if the ministerial exception 
were based on this “limitation on judicial decisionmaking,” then it would 
amount to a jurisdictional bar precluding judicial resolution of such claims.  
 In this way, the jurisdictional paradigm provides a potential foundation 
for the ministerial exception—one that cannot be rejected simply on civil pro-
cedure grounds and one that as a normative matter precludes judicial resolu-
tion of such claims. As a result, for the Court to hold that the ministerial ex-
ception functions as an affirmative defense—and not a jurisdictional bar—
represents an implied attack on the jurisdictional paradigm on normative 
grounds that trace to the nature of church autonomy. Indeed, it is precisely 
this move that has opened the door for judicial adjudication of religious dis-
putes where a court had deemed the ministerial exception waived. See infra 
note 44. Wasserman notes that understanding the ministerial exception as an 
affirmative defense does not preclude the possibility that parties should not be 
authorized to waive the defense. See Wasserman, supra note 31, at 315. How-
ever, this is not how courts addressing waiver in the wake of Hosanna-Tabor 
have applied the doctrine. See Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 
F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that the defendant waived the min-
isterial exception by failing to raise it in its brief before the court of appeals); 
Petschonek v. Catholic Diocese of Memphis, No. W2011-02216-COA-R9-CV, 
2012 WL 1868212, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2012) (holding that the de-
fendant’s failure to raise the ministerial exception before the trial court pre-
vented consideration of the defense on appeal). 
 35. See Wasserman, supra note 23, at 1547–48. 
 36. Id. at 1548. 
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a doctrine requiring judicial abstention, the Court refashioned 
the ministerial exception as an affirmative defense to be as-
serted by the defendant that simply contests the underlying 
merits of the claim.37 And as a defense to be asserted, the min-
isterial exception—and, in turn, the religious clauses upon 
which it is based—now appears to provide an affirmative right 
to religious institutions shielding them from various forms of 
discrimination-based liability. Moreover, as an affirmative de-
fense to be asserted, the ministerial exception can be waived by 
a religious institution, apparently authorizing a court to adju-
dicate the dispute so long as no defense is raised.38 Indeed, 
courts have already begun adopting this approach in the wake 
of Hosanna-Tabor, holding the ministerial exception defense 
waived when the defendant has failed to raise it before the trial 
court.39
Given this shift in Hosanna-Tabor, it is not surprising that 
the Court struggled to articulate why individuals have no right 
to accommodation from facially neutral and generally applica-
ble laws, but institutions can avoid liability from employment 
discriminations statutes. According to the Court, “a church’s se-
lection of its ministers is unlike an individual’s ingestion of pe-
yote.”
  
40 “Smith involved government regulation of only outward 
physical acts. The present case, in contrast, concerns govern-
ment interference with an internal church decision that affects 
the faith and mission of the church itself.”41
 
 37. See Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Proce-
dure Revival, 31 REV. LITIG. 313, 350 (2012) (“[T]he Court reached out to pro-
nounce that the First Amendment’s ministerial exemption to federal employ-
ment law is a constitutional affirmative defense to the merits of a 
discrimination claim and not a limit on the court’s adjudicative jurisdiction, 
continuing its drive to clarify the line between jurisdiction and merits.”). But 
see supra note 
 Commentators 
have puzzled over the Court’s invocation of “outward physical 
34. 
 38. See 2-8 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE 
¶ 8.27[3] (2d ed. 1996) (“If a party fails to plead an affirmative defense when 
required to do so by Rule 8(c), the defense is waived.”). 
 39. See Hamilton, 680 F.3d at 1318; Petschonek, 2012 WL 1868212, at *6. 
In addition to the implications for waiver, some are predicting that the Court’s 
deeming the ministerial exception an affirmative defense will have significant 
impact on the costs of such litigation because “resolution of these claims will 
take longer and be more expensive and contentious.” Mark E. Chopko & 
Marissa Parker, Still a Threshold Question: Refining the Ministerial Exception 
Post-Hosanna-Tabor, 10 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 233, 299 (2012). 
 40. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. 
Ct. 694, 707 (2012). 
 41. Id. at 697.  
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acts”; is termination of an employee not also an outward physi-
cal act?42
More fundamentally, commentators have struggled to ex-
plain how Hosanna-Tabor could have endorsed the constitu-
tionally protected autonomy of religious institutions over mat-
ters of “faith and mission” and yet simultaneously 
characterized the ministerial exception as merely an affirma-
tive defense subject to waiver by the parties.
  
43 If institutions 
are to retain autonomy over core religious matters, how then 
can courts be allowed to adjudicate religious disputes where 
parties have waived the affirmative defense of the ministerial 
exception?44
 
 42. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Ministers and Peyote, DORF ON LAW (Jan. 
12, 2012, 12:30 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2012/01/ministers-and-peyote 
.html (responding to the Supreme Court’s attempt in Hosanna-Tabor to dis-
tinguish Employment Division v. Smith by querying “With due respect: 
huh???”); Jeffrey Pasek, Ministerial Exemption Is Shrouded in Uncertainty, 
JURIST–HOTLINE (Jan. 21, 2012), http://jurist.org/sidebar/2012/01/jeffrey 
-pasek-ministerial-ada.php (“arguing the internal-external distinction is new 
and hardly self-explanatory,” but the “Hosanna-Tabor opinion said little to il-
luminate or defend it”); see also Caroline Mala Corbin, The Irony of Hosanna-
Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 96, 104 (2011) (analyzing Hosanna-Tabor under the Smith stand-
ard); Carl H. Esbeck, A Religious Organization’s Autonomy in Matters of Self-
Governance: Hosanna-Tabor and the First Amendment, 13 ENGAGE (forthcom-
ing 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2016930 (analyzing the 
Court’s distinction between the ministerial exception and Employment Divi-
sion).  
 
 43. See, e.g., Chopko & Parker, supra note 39, at 291. 
 44. It is important to note here that footnote four poses a challenge to the 
jurisdictional understanding of the religion clauses because it allows for the 
possibility of waiver. The normative commitments of advocates of the jurisdic-
tional paradigm have long entailed a view that parties could not waive the 
ministerial exception because courts were either adjudicatively disabled from 
resolving such claims or because the Establishment Clause served as a struc-
tural bar prohibiting courts from resolving such claims. See, e.g., Esbeck, su-
pra note 13, at 58 n.236 (“A free exercise right could be waived by the claim-
ant. But if the operative principle is a constitutional limit on the Court’s 
power, then the objection to judicial inquiry into religious doctrine cannot be 
waived. Thus, it can be inferred that the rule of law in these cases is structur-
al in origin.”); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 17, at 135–36 (“The disabling effect 
of the necessity to decide certain questions is jurisdictional in the strong 
sense—that is, it cannot be waived or conferred by consent of the parties.”). 
 To be sure, some civil procedure scholars have argued that there is no 
clear line differentiating affirmative defenses and jurisdictional bars. See, e.g., 
Scott Dodson, Hybridizing Jurisdiction, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1439, 1454–55 
(2011). On this account, some jurisdictional bars might have some attributes 
typically associated with affirmative defenses and some affirmative defenses 
may, at times, take on the characteristics of jurisdictional bars. This view, of 
course, is not the conventional view. See id. at 1445 (“[J]urisdiction typically is 
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What becomes clear in the wake of Hosanna-Tabor’s foot-
note four is that some alternative theory must animate the 
Court’s vision of religious institutional autonomy. The theory 
must account for the Court’s rejection of the jurisdictional ap-
proach to the ministerial exception; it must explain why the 
Court appears willing to allow lower courts to resolve disputes 
implicating religious matters where the constitutional concerns 
have not been raised by the parties; and it must explain why 
the Court sees a fundamental difference between individual 
claims for accommodation and institutional claims for autono-
my.  
Footnote four gestures towards such an alternative theory 
by reorienting our religion clause jurisprudence away from the 
structural and jurisdictional limitations we place on courts and 
towards the autonomy and authority we grant religious institu-
tions.45 This Article aims to build on this shift embedded in 
footnote four by mining the Supreme Court’s articulations of 
the doctrine in its early church property cases.46 In short, this 
Article claims that far from the jurisdictional approaches to 
church-state relations, the Supreme Court’s decision in Hosan-
na-Tabor lays the groundwork for reconceptualizing church au-
tonomy as a constitutionalized version of arbitration.47
 
characterized by a rigid set of effects that place it beyond the control of the 
parties: A jurisdictional rule can be raised at any time, including for the first 
time on appeal; it obligates the court to police compliance sua sponte; and it is 
not subject to principles of equity, waiver, forfeiture, consent, or estoppel . . . . 
[N]onjurisdictional rules usually are defined as having all the inverse effects 
of jurisdictionality—they can be waived, forfeited, or consented to, and they 
are subject to equitable exceptions, estoppel, and judicial discretion.”). To the 
extent that courts interpret footnote four as categorizing the ministerial ex-
ception as an affirmative defense, but still having all the characteristics typi-
cally associated with jurisdictional bars, the Supreme Court’s holding in Ho-
sanna-Tabor may not unsettle the jurisdictional paradigm. Not surprisingly, 
however, courts thus far have not taken this route, concluding that the minis-
terial exception can be waived. See Hamilton, 680 F.3d at 1318 (holding that 
the defendant waived the ministerial exception by failing to raise it in its brief 
before the court of appeals); Petschonek, 2012 WL 1868212, at *6 (holding that 
the defendant’s failure to raise the ministerial exception before the trial court 
prevented consideration of the defense on appeal). And these instances of 
waiver highlight why footnote four is likely to require a rethinking of the nor-
mative foundations of both the ministerial exception in particular and church 
autonomy more broadly.  
  
 45. See supra notes 13–22 and accompanying text. 
 46. See infra Part II.  
 47. See infra Part II. 
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The hallmarks of arbitration include two primary features: 
(1) parties grant arbitrators authority through consent48 and (2) 
the decisions of duly appointed arbitrators, while granted sub-
stantive deference, are subject to review for misconduct, fraud, 
or other forms of adjudicative “naughtiness.”49 Importantly, the 
deference and authority granted arbitrators has nothing to do 
with the incompetence of courts or an attempt to emphasize the 
limited nature of state power; arbitrators have authority be-
cause parties jointly choose to place their disputes within the 
jurisdiction of an alternative forum for resolution.50
In the Court’s early articulations, church autonomy fol-
lowed a similar script. On the one hand, the Court originally 
grounded church autonomy in the “implied consent” of the reli-
gious institution’s members.
  
51 And the Court’s early decisions 
recognized that the decisions of religious institutions “are ac-
cepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive,” but 
only after a “marginal civil court review”52 ensuring “the ab-
sence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness.”53 Between implied 
consent and marginal civil court review remained a space for 
autonomous decision-making on the part of religious institu-
tions. Moreover, this autonomy functioned as a right of the re-
ligious institution to govern matters properly placed within its 
authority by the implied consent of its members.54
 
 48. See generally Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability Af-
ter Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 
1001–03 (1996) (explaining the contractual approach to the unconscionability 
doctrine used in arbitration contexts); Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitra-
tion and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83, 145–46 (1996) [hereinaf-
ter Ware, Employment Arbitration] (emphasizing the importance of voluntary 
consent in employment and securities arbitration). 
 Put differ-
ently, the Court’s early church autonomy cases understood reli-
 49. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006) (listing the statutorily required grounds for 
vacatur); see also Amina Dammann, Note, Vacating Arbitration Awards for 
Mistakes of Fact, 27 REV. LITIG. 441, 470–75 (2008) (collecting state grounds 
for vacatur); cf. Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code–The Emperor’s 
New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967) (describing unconscionability 
as prohibiting “bargaining naughtiness”). 
 50. See H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1–2 (1924) (“Arbitration agreements are 
purely matters of contract, and the effect of the bill is simply to make the con-
tracting party live up to his agreement. . . . An arbitration agreement is placed 
upon the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs.”). 
 51. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871). 
 52. Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l 
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 447 (1969). 
 53. Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16 
(1929).  
 54. See infra Part II. 
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gious institutions as retaining a right to remain free from judi-
cial interference in religious matters and a right to deference in 
its resolution of religious questions.55
Reconceptualizing the church autonomy doctrine as a con-
stitutionalized version of arbitration provides two lines of in-
quiry for answering the lingering unresolved questions post-
Hosanna-Tabor regarding the scope of the autonomy granted 
religious institutions. Using arbitration as a blue print, the ear-
ly church property cases limit the church autonomy doctrine to 
instances where there is a basis for finding the implied consent 
of the parties
 
56 and where the institution governs and adjudi-
cates in the absence of fraud, collusion or arbitrariness.57 Put 
more simply, religious institutions retain authority over cases 
where the institution’s jurisdiction can both be justified on the 
front end via implied consent58 and justified on the back end via 
marginal review for adjudicative improprieties.59
Indeed, while the Court unanimously decided Hosanna-
Tabor, doing so came at the cost of leaving unresolved ques-
tions of who is a minister for the purposes of the ministerial ex-
ception
  
60 and whether courts can investigate pretext in the con-
text of ministerial exception.61
 
 55. For further discussion of the distinction between the Supreme Court’s 
early and more recent church autonomy cases, see Michael A. Helfand, Litigat-
ing Religion, 93 B.U. L. REV. 494, 521–41 (2013). 
 Leveraging this emphasis on 
implied consent and marginal review, an arbitration approach 
to church autonomy rejects overly mechanical approaches to 
 56. See infra Part II.A. 
 57. See infra Part II.B. 
 58. See infra Part II.A. 
 59. See infra Part II.B. 
 60. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. 
Ct. 694, 707 (2012) (“We are reluctant, however, to adopt a rigid formula for 
deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister. It is enough for us to con-
clude, in this our first case involving the ministerial exception, that the excep-
tion covers Perich, given all the circumstances of her employment.”). 
 61. The only mention of pretext came towards the end of the Court’s deci-
sion in a short paragraph dismissing the issue. See id. at 709. Significant dis-
cussion of such issues were only addressed in Hosanna-Tabor’s concurring 
opinions. See id. at 715 (Alito, J., concurring) (“What matters is that respond-
ent played an important role as an instrument of her church’s religious mes-
sage and as a leader of its worship activities . . . . For civil courts to engage 
in . . . pretext inquiry . . . would dangerously undermine the religious autono-
my that lower court case law has now protected for nearly four decades.”); id. 
at 710 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I write separately to note that, in my view, 
the Religion Clauses require civil courts to apply the ministerial exception and 
to defer to a religious organization’s good-faith understanding of who qualifies 
as its minister.”). 
  
1904 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:1891 
 
deciding who is a minister, instead inquiring whether a partic-
ular employment dispute falls within the core religious matters 
where members impliedly consent to the self-government of the 
religious institution.62
Similarly, determining whether a particular decision of a 
religious institution is pretextual should not be understood to 
per se undermine the constitutionally required sphere of au-
tonomous adjudication and self-government granted religious 
institutions.
  
63 Instead, religious institutions should receive def-
erence over the substance of their decisions like the deference 
granted to arbitrators, but courts should still employ the proce-
dural review for fraud, collusion, and arbitrariness embraced in 
the early church property decisions even as it has fallen out of 
favor in more recent Supreme Court pronouncements.64
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the 
doctrinal developments that gave rise to and entrenched the ju-
risdictional approach to the religion clauses. Part II provides an 
alternative vision of the religion clauses in the wake of Hosan-
na-Tabor’s footnote four. Specifically, this Part articulates how 
the principles of implied consent and marginal judicial review 
provide a vision of church autonomy that tracks the structure 
of arbitration. Part III applies the implied consent/arbitration 
model of church autonomy to some of the remaining questions 
regarding the ministerial exception left unresolved by the Su-
preme Court in Hosanna-Tabor. 
  
I.  CHURCH AUTONOMY AS JURISDICTIONAL   
As an umbrella term that captures a range of approaches 
to the religion clauses, jurisdictional approaches to the religion 
clauses have generally shared certain important similarities. 
At their core, jurisdictional theories envision a fortified wall be-
tween church and state, which captures the notion that religion 
and state each inhabit different and independent jurisdic-
tions.65
 
 62. See infra Part III.A. 
 But this “dual jurisdiction” approach often has a partic-
 63. See infra Part III.B. 
 64. See infra Part III.B. 
 65. See, e.g., Horwitz, Act III, supra note 13, at 161–62 (“[C]ourts, and the 
state itself, are simply not authorized to intervene in life at the heart of 
churches. At a deep level, these questions lie beyond the reach of the state al-
together. The two kingdoms of temporal and spiritual authority, of church and 
state, constitute two separate sovereigns.”); Horwitz, Churches as First 
Amendment Institutions, supra note 13, at 114 (concluding that under “a 
sphere sovereignty approach to religious entities,” religious institutions 
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ular spin; these “jurisdictional” approaches do not focus directly 
on the scope of autonomy constitutionally granted to religious 
institutions.66 Instead they focus on the constitutionally re-
quired limitations placed on governmental intervention in reli-
gious institutional life.67
To some degree this emphasis on governmental limitations 
as opposed to institutional rights tracked a larger shift in con-
stitutional scholarship away from the Free Exercise Clause and 




“would coexist alongside the state . . . serving a vital role in furthering self-
fulfillment, the development of a religious community, and the development of 
public discourse”); Mark DeWolfe Howe, Political Theory and the Nature of 
Liberty, 67 HARV. L. REV. 91, 94 (1953) (interpreting the Supreme Court’s 
church property cases and concluding that “the Court may have been persuad-
ed that a church must enjoy prerogatives of sovereignty which are not to be 
conceded to other social groups.”); Steven D. Smith, Freedom of Religion or 
Freedom of the Church 30–31 (San Diego Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 
11-061, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1911412 (arguing that 
courts and scholars have erroneously discarded the core jurisdictional and in-
stitutional impulse behind the religion clauses). 
 But the factors propelling 
 66. See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 13, at 55 (“If the law is to order two enti-
ties (‘separation of church and state’), the law must first recognize the exist-
ence of both entities. The juridical consequence is that the status of religious 
entities is acknowledged by the Establishment Clause, and a sphere is re-
served in which religious entities may operate unhindered by government in 
accordance with their own understanding of divine origin and mission.”); Lupu 
& Tuttle, supra note 17, at 122 (arguing that the prohibition against courts 
adjudicating religious claims is not based on some constitutional desire to 
“systematically protect the interests of certain classes of parties, defined by 
religious mission”). 
 67. See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 13, at 57–58 (“Indeed, in some cases it is 
the religious rights claimant inviting the Court to make the inquiry into reli-
gious doctrine, and it is the Court refusing to do so. Thus, the rule could not be 
vindicating a free exercise right. Some would even expand the concept of juris-
dictional dismissals and dual sovereigns as encapsuling the entire law of gov-
ernment-religion relations.”); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 17, at 122 (arguing 
that courts avoid intervening in religious disputes because religious “claims 
would require courts to answer questions that the state is not competent to 
address”). 
 68. This shift is most vivid in some of Douglas Laycock’s continued analy-
sis of church autonomy. Compare Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory 
of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to 
Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1396 (1981) [hereinafter Laycock, 
Towards a General Theory] (arguing that in church schism cases “[w]hen a 
secular court awards property or an ecclesiastical post on the basis of its reso-
lution of a question of religious doctrine, it establishes the winning faction. 
But this is merely a consequence of the primary constitutional violation—
interfering with the right of the original church, which included both factions, 
to resolve the controversy itself.”), with Douglas Laycock, Church Autonomy 
Revisited, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 253, 262–64 (2009) [hereinafter Laycock, 
Church Autonomy] (considering doctrinal developments related to church au-
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this interpretive shift towards a “negative” construction of 
church autonomy—that is, understanding autonomy as the ab-
sence of justified governmental authority—was grounded in a 
series of doctrinal developments related to both of the religion 
clauses. 
A. FROM INSTITUTIONAL ESTABLISHMENT TO GOVERNMENTAL 
ENTANGLEMENT 
The first of these doctrinal developments pertained to the 
incorporation of the Supreme Court’s newly minted entangle-
ment doctrine into the church property cases.69 In the early 
church property disputes, the Court’s decisions raised estab-
lishment concerns, but did so in the context of the affirmative 
institutional rights of religious organizations. Thus, in its 1871 
decision Watson v. Jones, the Court famously stated that “[t]he 
law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no 
dogma, the establishment of no sect.”70
The right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the 
expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create 
tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the 
association, and for the ecclesiastical government of all the individual 
members, congregations, and officers within the general association, 
is unquestioned.
 The Court immediately 
followed this sentence with an affirmative description of the in-
stitutional rights guaranteed religious organizations:  
71
Indeed, this strong articulation of institutional autonomy was 
further buttressed by the Court’s noting that “religious unions” 
retain a “right to establish tribunals for the decision of ques-
 
 
tonomy and noting that while he does “not have much confidence in the Estab-
lishment Clause as a way to do an end run around Smith,” the fact that Em-
ployment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), “shrinks the Free Exercise Clause 
to a substantial but still undetermined extent, certainly encourages lawyers to 
look for Establishment Clause explanations [for the ministerial exception]”).  
 69. The entanglement doctrine primarily draws from the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (describing the 
third prong of its analysis as inquiring whether a statute fosters “excessive 
government entanglement with religion”), and Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New 
York, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (inquiring whether the government regulation 
at issue would result in excessive entanglement). Worries of entanglement 
first appeared in the Supreme Court’s church property cases in 1976 with the 
Court’s decision in Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 
709 (1976) (“Even when rival church factions seek resolution of a church prop-
erty dispute in the civil courts there is substantial danger that the State will 
become entangled in essentially religious controversies or intervene on behalf 
of groups espousing particular doctrinal beliefs.”). 
 70. 80 U.S. (13. Wall.) 679, 728 (1871). 
 71. Id. at 728–29. 
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tions arising among themselves.”72 Approximately 70 years lat-
er, the Court distilled this notion of church autonomy into a 
“freedom for religious organizations,” which entailed “an inde-
pendence from secular control or manipulation” in adjudicating 
“matters of church government as well as those of faith and 
doctrine.”73 In this way, the Court linked the prohibition 
against government establishing a sect to the affirmative right 
of religious institutions to establish their own method of dis-
pute resolution and self-government.74
This institutional reading of the religion clauses—
understanding the prohibition against governmental estab-
lishment of religion as tied to the institutional right to estab-
lish organs of self-government
  
75—largely dissipated in the Su-
preme Court’s jurisprudence’s since the mid-20th century.76
 
 72. Id. at 729. 
 
 73. Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 
344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952). 
 74. For a further discussion of this link, see Helfand, supra note 55, at 
505. 
 75. To be sure, the Court’s decision in Watson v. Jones was grounded in 
federal common law and not in the First Amendment. See, e.g., Arlin M. Ad-
ams & William R. Hanlon, Jones v. Wolf: Church Autonomy and the Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1292 (1980). Howev-
er, the Court’s decision in Watson was subsequently constitutionalized in 
Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 115–16 . Indeed, the Court’s holdings and analyses pre-
Kedroff continue to be treated as contributing to the contours of contemporary 
constitutional doctrine. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary 
Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 447 (1969) (“In 
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, the Court converted the principle of Watson 
as qualified by Gonzalez into a constitutional rule.” (citation omitted)). For a 
discussion of this non-establishment issue in Watson, see Kurt T. Lash, Be-
yond Incorporation, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 447, 456–59 (2009). 
 76. See infra notes 78–83 and accompanying text. Indeed, as I have ar-
gued elsewhere, from 1872 (Watson) through 1952 (Kedroff), lower courts––
taking their cue from the Supreme Court––were far more willing than modern 
courts to adjudicate cases that turned on religious doctrine or practice. See 
Helfand, supra note 55, at 559–60; see also Smith v. Pedigo, 33 N.E. 777, 786 
(Ind. 1893) (awarding church property to a minority faction because the major-
ity had departed from the original belief and faith of the church); Montgomery 
v. Snyder, 320 S.W.2d 283, 291 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958) (examining the faiths, 
fundamental doctrines, and practices of two Baptist organizations, and finding 
each doctrinally identical); Fulbright v. Higginbotham, 34 S.W. 875, 877 (Mo. 
1896) (“It . . . sometimes becomes necessary for the civil courts, for the purpose 
of determining property rights of members, to pass upon questions which are 
ecclesiastical in their nature.”); Cohen v. Eisenberg, 19 N.Y.S.2d 678, 681 
(Sup. Ct. 1940) (determining the plaintiff’s kosher poultry trade to have been, 
in fact, kosher, and, in turn, finding the defendant’s public proclamation that 
the plaintiff’s poultry trade was not kosher to have been defamatory), aff’d 24 
N.Y.S.2d 1004 (App. Div. 1940); Philomath Coll. v. Wyatt, 37 P. 1022, 1024 
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Instead, the Court recast its Establishment Clause doctrine as 
circumscribing judicial resolution of religious questions, there-
by focusing not on the autonomous space created by the Estab-
lishment Clause, but on the inability of courts to address sub-
stantive religious claims.77
Tracing the origins of this shift from institutional autono-
my to judicial abstention begins with a pair of concurrences 
filed by Justice Brennan. First, in School District of Abington 
Township v. Schempp, Brennan re-characterized the Court’s 
early church property cases as “requiring on the part of all or-
gans of government a strict neutrality toward theological ques-
tions, courts should not undertake to decide such questions.”
  
78
Second, in Maryland & Virginia Eldership of the Churches 
of God v. Church of God of Sharpsburg, Inc., Justice Brennan 
further argued that the Establishment Clause prohibited judi-
cial inquiry into substantive theological questions: “To permit 
civil courts to probe deeply enough into the allocation of power 
within a [hierarchical] church so as to decide . . . religious law 
[governing church polity] . . . would violate the First Amend-





(Or. 1894) (“It is a solemn matter to invade the domain of religious beliefs and 
dogmas, to explore doctrine, and decide intangible, metaphysical questions 
pertaining to the Godhead; and courts have a delicacy in entering upon this 
field of investigation, and will not do so unless it is necessary for the purpose of 
determining questions of civil or property rights.” (emphasis added)); 
Schlichter v. Keiter, 27 A. 45, 57 (Pa. 1893) (determining whether “revision [to 
the church constitution and statement of faith] made a complete theological 
departure from the creed of the church” the court wrote: “We have attentively 
considered the suggestions made to us on the subject by the appellant, we 
have examined the old and the revised confessions, we have read the testimo-
ny of the distinguished theological experts who were called to testify as to the 
alleged doctrinal differences, and we are satisfied that the master and the 
court were right” in deciding that there “has been no substantial departure 
from the ancient belief of the church.”); Deaderick v. Lampson, 58 Tenn. (11 
Heisk.) 523, 535–36 (1872) (“[S]o far as the identity of the respective claimants 
with the beneficiary to whom the church property was dedicated, may be af-
fected by their doctrines, or by the acts of the General Assembly in that case, 
the essential coincidence the doctrines and the legal effect of those acts must 
necessarily be considered for the purpose of deciding the question of title to the 
property. These principles will sustain the jurisdiction of civil courts in cases 
like the present . . . .”) (quoting Gartin v. Penick, 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 110, 122 
(1868)). 
 
 77. See infra notes 77–82 and accompanying text.  
 78. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 243 (1963) 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 79. 396 U.S. 367, 369 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).  
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Reformulating the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence 
in this way altered the trajectory of the church autonomy in-
quiry away from constitutionally demanded autonomy for reli-
gious institutions and toward constitutionally required absten-
tion from judicial inquiry into religious questions.80
The fallacy fatal to the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court is that 
it rests upon an impermissible rejection of the decisions of the highest 
ecclesiastical tribunals of this hierarchical church upon the issues in 
dispute, and impermissibly substitutes its own inquiry into church 
polity and resolutions based thereon of those disputes.
 This shift 
became entrenched in the constitutional landscape with the 
Court’s majority opinion—also authored by Brennan—in Serbi-
an Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, where the Court 
stated:  
81
The rationale for this prohibition, however, was not directly 
tied to the constitutionally protected autonomy of religious in-
stitutions. Instead, it rested on the fact that the resolution of 
intra-church disputes “frequently necessitates the interpreta-
tion of ambiguous religious law and usage” and, “in much the 
same manner as civil determination of religious doctrine,” 
would “violate the First Amendment.”
  
82 Put differently, the rea-
son why courts must defer to the religious decision of religious 
institutions does not rest on the autonomy granted these insti-
tutions—such autonomy is simply the by-product of a more 
basic constitutional prohibition against judicial inquiry into re-
ligious questions.83
Recasting the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
raised two important questions. First, if the rationale underly-
ing judicial deference to religious institutions lay in the consti-
  
 
 80. Cf. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence 
of Religious Group Rights, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 99, 132–33. 
 81. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708 (1976). 
 82. Id. at 708–09 (quoting Md. & Va. Churches, 396 U.S. at 369 (Brennan, 
J., concurring)). 
 83. See Christopher Lund, The New Free Exercise Clause, 108 NW. U. L. 
REV (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 43) (on file with author) (noting that 
the “root of the problem” requiring dismissal of a minister’s claim for breach of 
contract is not the impermissibility of judicial intervention in religious ques-
tions, but because decisions over matters of internal church governance are 
properly within the constitutionally protected autonomy of the religious insti-
tutions). Disconnecting the church property cases from church autonomy be-
came a source of significant scholarly critique. See, e.g., Adams & Hanlon, su-
pra note 75, at 1294–97; Perry Dane, The Maps of Sovereignty: A Meditation, 
12 CARDOZO L. REV. 959, 969 (1991); John H. Mansfield, The Religion Clauses 
of the First Amendment and the Philosophy of the Constitution, 72 CALIF. L. 
REV. 847, 858–68 (1984). 
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tutional imperative to avoid religious questions, could courts 
resolve religious questions when the religious institutions be-
fore the court waived the constitutionally mandated deference? 
 The Supreme Court’s answer here seemed to be an une-
quivocal and not particularly surprising “no.”84 Indeed, the 
Court was quick to couch this response in its newly announced 
“entanglement” doctrine,85 explaining that judicial resolution of 
religious questions violated the First Amendment “[e]ven when 
rival church factions seek resolution of a church property dis-
pute in the civil courts” because “there is substantial danger 
that the State will become entangled in essentially religious 
controversies or intervene on behalf of groups espousing par-
ticular doctrinal beliefs.”86
 Inverting the church autonomy inquiry also gave rise to 
another question: should courts defer to the decisions of reli-
gious institutions on church autonomy grounds where the court 
can avoid resolving the underlying religious doctrinal dispute? 
Here again the Court built upon in its newly minted Estab-
lishment Clause doctrine, holding that courts may resolve reli-
gious disputes so long as they rely “exclusively on objective, 
well-established concepts . . . familiar to lawyers and judges.”
 This refusal was a direct corollary of 
the Court’s Establishment Clause shift; if the Establishment 
Clause is interpreted to place restrictions on courts—as op-
posed to providing autonomy to religious institutions—then the 
fact that parties voluntarily submit their religious dispute to a 
court is irrelevant. All that matters is whether adjudicating a 
dispute would potentially “entangle” a court in religious ques-
tions.  
87
The primary advantages of the neutral-principles approach are that it 
is completely secular in operation, and yet flexible enough to accom-
modate all forms of religious organization and polity. The meth-
od . . . thereby promises to free civil courts completely from entangle-
ment in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice.
 
Thus, deference to religious institutions on matters of self-
government and adjudication was not constitutionally neces-
sary where courts could resolve such matters without becoming 
impermissibly entangled in religious questions. In the words of 
the Court:  
88
 
 84. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 709. 
  
 85. See supra note 69. 
 86. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 709 (emphasis added). 
 87. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979). 
 88. Id. (emphasis added). 
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In this way, the shift in Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
from deference toward religious institutions to entanglement in 
religious questions had two important outcomes. First, entan-
glement worries could not be waived by the parties to the liti-
gation.89 Second, where courts could avoid entanglement they 
could simply ignore the internal decision making of religious 
institutions.90
 Framing the doctrine in this way was predicated on a 
view that courts were judicially incompetent of resolving reli-
gious questions.
 All that mattered from this new perspective was 
whether courts would impermissibly resolve religious ques-
tions.  
91 This assumption of judicial incompetence 
could be based upon two different arguments: either because 
courts lacked the institutional knowledge and ability to address 
religious questions92 or because courts lacked the jurisdictional 
authority to resolve religious questions.93 On either count, how-
ever, the conception of the Establishment Clause underlying 
the shift from religious institutions to religious questions was 
jurisdictional. The autonomy granted religious institutions was 
a function of the withdrawal of courts from the sphere of reli-
gious questions. Thus, courts could not resolve religious ques-
tions because they lacked competence, thereby rendering them 
adjudicatively disabled from addressing claims that turned on 
religious doctrine or practice. As a result, even if religious insti-
tutions wanted courts to resolve a religious dispute, courts 
could not do so because they lacked jurisdiction over such mat-
ters.94
 
 89. See supra notes 
 Put simply, the Establishment Clause worries were all 
84–86 and accompanying text. 
 90. See supra notes 87–87 and accompanying text. 
 91. Esbeck, supra note 13, at 6 (“Examining the Court’s dismissals for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction further reveals the Supreme Court’s view of 
the Establishment Clause. Such dismissals happen when a court is asked to 
resolve disputes on topics over which the court deems itself as having no com-
petence.”); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 17, at 138 (arguing that courts avoid in-
tervening in religious disputes because religious “claims would require courts 
to answer questions that the state is not competent to address”). 
 92. See, e.g., Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 17, at 143–45 (noting, for exam-
ple, that “[c]ourts cannot decide whether a congregation has engaged in dis-
criminatory conduct toward a ministerial employee without first determining 
a set of qualifications for holding the role”). 
 93. See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 13, at 55–56 (“The jurisdictional conse-
quence of [the separation of church and state] is that . . . a sphere is reserved 
in which religious entities may operate unhindered by government in accord-
ance with their own understanding of divine origin and mission.”). 
 94. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 436 U.S. 696, 709 (1976); 
see also Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State Set-
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about what courts could not do; they were not about what reli-
gious institutions could do. And reframing the Establishment 
Clause in this way captured the core of what the jurisdictional 
view of the religion clauses was all about. 
B. THE DWINDLING SCOPE OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE  
The foundational changes in the Supreme Court’s Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence are only part of the story of how 
church autonomy morphed from a doctrine about institutional 
autonomy to a doctrine about governmental limitations. Anoth-
er key component of this doctrinal shift lay in the Supreme 
Court’s overhaul of its Free Exercise jurisprudence, most nota-
bly in its landmark 1990 decision Employment Division v. 
Smith.95
In Smith, the Supreme Court faced the Free Exercise claim 
of Alfred Smith and Galen Black, both of whom were denied 
unemployment compensation because they had been fired for 
misconduct.
  
96 Smith and Black, however, argued that such a 
denial violated their First Amendment rights because the al-
leged misconduct—smoking peyote—was part of a Native 
American Church ceremony.97
Rejecting the claims of Smith and Black, the Supreme 
Court held that the Free Exercise Clause does not protect indi-
viduals from facially neutral and generally applicable laws;
 
98 
instead, the Free Exercise Clause protects religious practice 
from being impermissibly targeted by laws for worse treat-
ment.99
 
tlement in the Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385, 1589 (“The 
First Amendment, with its doctrine of church autonomy, is a recognition . . . 
that the civil courts have no subject matter jurisdiction over the internal af-
fairs of religious organizations.”). 
 To do otherwise, contended the Court, “would be to 
 95. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 96. Id. at 874. 
 97. Id. at 874–75. 
 98. Id. at 878–79 (“Subsequent decisions have consistently held that the 
right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply 
with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the 
law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or pro-
scribes).’” (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, 
J., concurring))). 
 99. Id. at 877 (“It would be true, we think (though no case of ours has in-
volved the point), that a State would be ‘prohibiting the free exercise [of reli-
gion]’ if it sought to ban such acts or abstentions only when they are engaged 
in for religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that they dis-
play.” (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I)). 
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make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the 
law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a 
law unto himself.”100 Such a conclusion would “contradict[] both 
constitutional tradition and common sense.”101
The Court’s decision sent shockwaves through both the po-
litical and scholarly communities, leading to new waves of fed-
eral legislation
 
102 and litigation103 on the one hand and scholarly 
writing and debate on the other.104
 
 100. Id. at 879 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 
(1878)). 
 Among the many questions 
 101. Id. at 885. 
 102. See, e.g., Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5 (2006); Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 
1488. 
 103. See, e.g., Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 
546 U.S. 418, 436 (2006) (finding the government failed to show a compelling 
interest, under RFRA, to enforce the Control Substances Act against a reli-
gious group’s ritual use of hoasca); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 
(1997) (determining Congress exceeded the scope of its enforcement power un-
der section five of the Fourteenth Amendment by enacting RFRA, as it applied 
to the states’ general authority); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. 
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531–32 (1993) (finding a city ordinance restrict-
ing the slaughter of animals to neither have been neutral nor generally appli-
cable under Smith); Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 
F.3d 643, 663 (10th Cir. 2006) (determining “religious exercise” protected un-
der RLUIPA extended beyond merely “fundamental” or “central” religious ac-
tivities); Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 
170 F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 1999) (expanding the application of Smith beyond 
criminal prohibitions); Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1554–56 (8th Cir. 
1996) (holding that RFRA neither prohibited prison guards from cutting Na-
tive American plaintiffs’ hair nor from keeping them from using a sweat lodge, 
though such acts deprived plaintiffs of their religious practices and customs); 
Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of the Ohio State Univ., Coll. of Veterinary Med., 5 
F.3d 177, 181 (6th Cir. 1993) (relying on Smith, the court determined that 
Ohio State’s College of Veterinary Medicine did not violate the plaintiff’s free 
exercise rights when it required her to take a class which included the killing 
of animals, despite plaintiff’s objection that such practice was incompatible 
with her religious conscience and beliefs). 
 104. See, e.g., James D. Gordon, III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 
CALIF. L. REV. 91, 91 (1991) (setting the argument in dialogue form between a 
teacher and his student, Gordon presents a religious teacher lamenting over 
the Smith decision, claiming the Court retreated from its precedent, “used 
shoddy reasoning,” and deprived the free exercise clause largely of its signifi-
cance); Marci A. Hamilton, The Belief/Conduct Paradigm in the Supreme 
Court’s Free Exercise Jurisprudence: A Theological Account of the Failure to 
Protect Religious Conduct, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 713, 749 (1993) (“Smith is not rad-
ically different from its forerunners; the single change made is a downward 
adjustment of the level of scrutiny to be applied to regulations of conduct . . . . 
Given the way in which the paradigm normally tends to devalue conduct and 
elevates the interest of the state, such a change is not as startling as early 
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Smith raised was what to do about the significant precedent 
shielding religious institutions’ liability under employment dis-
crimination statutes. This shield—referred to as the ministerial 
exception—had for the most part been understood as based on 
the Free Exercise Clause105 and subsequently adopted by the 
federal courts of appeals.106 And yet, the Court’s holding in 
Smith seemed at odds with the ministerial exception: If the 
Free Exercise Clause did not require government to provide in-
dividuals with accommodation from facially neutral and gener-
ally applicable laws, then how could religious institutions be 
shielded from liability under employment discrimination stat-
utes? Such statutes were undoubtedly facially neutral and gen-
erally applicable.107
One response to this tension was to distinguish between 
the scope of the Free Exercise Clause as applied to individuals 




readings of Smith declared.”); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revision-
ism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1153 (1990) (contending 
that Smith illegitimately reinterpreted the free exercise clause through nor-
mative judgments instead of through “the constitutional text, history and 
precedent”); Michael W. McConnell, Should Congress Pass Legislation Restor-
ing the Broader Interpretation of Free Exercise of Religion?, 15 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 181, 183–84 (1992) (claiming Smith departed from its precedent by 
forgoing the “compelling state interest” requirement, and that it would befit 
Congress to respond by legislatively re-broadening the application of First 
Amendment protections under its Fourteenth Amendment powers). 
 Along these lines, the 
 105. The ministerial exception was first announced by the Fifth Circuit in 
McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972), where the court 
found “that the application of the provisions of Title VII to the employment 
relationship existing between The Salvation Army and Mrs. McClure, a 
church and its minister would result in an encroachment by the State into an 
area of religious freedom which it is forbidden to enter by the principles of the 
free exercise clause of the First Amendment.” Id. at 560. Prior to Smith, courts 
typically followed suit and discussed the ministerial exception primarily in the 
context of the Free Exercise Clause. See, e.g., Minker v. Balt. Annual Confer-
ence of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (exam-
ining the ministerial exception in the context of the Free Exercise Clause and 
noting that it was therefore unnecessary to discuss the potential applicability 
of the Establishment Clause); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day 
Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985) (characterizing the ministerial 
exception as primarily a free exercise doctrine). 
 106. See, e.g., Brady, supra note 25, at 1651 (collecting cases and noting 
that “[b]eginning with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in McClure v. Salvation Ar-
my, lower federal courts have uniformly carved out what has become known as 
the ‘ministerial exception’ to employment discrimination statutes”). 
 107. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 108. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 306 (3d Cir. 2006) (“The Free 
Exercise Clause protects not only the individual’s right to believe and profess 
whatever religious doctrine one desires, but also a religious institution’s right 
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D.C. Circuit emphasized that “the burden on free exercise that 
is addressed by the ministerial exception is of a fundamentally 
different character from that at issue in Smith” because “[t]he 
ministerial exception is not invoked to protect the freedom of 
an individual to observe a particular command or practice of 
his church. Rather, it is designed to protect the freedom of the 
church to select those who will carry out its religious mis-
sion.”109 Thus, the Third Circuit noted that notwithstanding 
Smith, the Free Exercise Clause still protected “a religious in-
stitution’s right to decide matters of faith, doctrine, and church 
governance.”110
While some courts did highlight the fundamental differ-
ence between an individual’s Free Exercise claims and a reli-
gious institution’s Free Exercise claims, an increasing number 
of judicial opinions and scholarly articles resolved the tension 
between Smith and the ministerial exception by emphasizing 




One prominent proponent of this approach has been Judge 
Richard Posner, who interpreted Smith as demonstrating that 
the Establishment Clause—and not the Free Exercise Clause—




In reading into statutes of general applicability an exception favora-
ble to religious organizations, the courts may seem to be flouting the 
doctrine of Employment Division v. Smith . . . . But the ministers ex-
ception is a rule of interpretation, not a constitutional rule; and 
though it is derived from policies that animate the First Amendment, 
the relevant policies come from the establishment clause rather than 
from the free-exercise clause. The purpose of the doctrine is not to 
benefit marginal religions that, lacking the political muscle to obtain 
legislative protections of their rituals and observances, turn to the 
courts instead; it is to avoid judicial involvement in religious matters, 
 As noted by Judge Posner,  
 
to decide matters of faith, doctrine, and church governance.” (internal quota-
tion marks and citation omitted)); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 
462 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the 
United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 349 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing approving-
ly the court’s analysis in Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 462). 
 109. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 462. 
 110. Petruska, 462 F.3d at 306. 
 111. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the 
Ministerial Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1965, 2004–05 (2007). It is worth noting that at least one court has suggested 
that the ministerial exception falls within Smith’s “hybrid-rights” exception. 
See Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 467. 
 112. Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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such as claims of discrimination that if vindicated would limit a 
church’s ability to determine who shall be its ministers.113
Other courts have not been quite so clear in their approach to 
the ministerial exception post-Smith. That being said, prior to 
Hosanna-Tabor, federal courts implicitly pursued a similar ap-
proach, relying much more heavily in post-Smith decisions on 
the Establishment Clause when articulating the constitutional 
foundations of the ministerial exception.
  
114 As Douglas Laycock 
has noted, even though he does “not have much confidence in 
the Establishment Clause as a way to do an end run around 
Smith,”115 the fact that Smith “shrinks the Free Exercise 
Clause to a substantial but still undetermined extent, certainly 
encourages lawyers to look for Establishment Clause explana-
tions [for the ministerial exception].”116 According to Ira Lupu 
and Robert Tuttle, Smith demonstrated that “the ‘ministerial 
exception’ could no longer rest on a doctrine of free exercise ex-
emptions,”117 further indicating the Establishment Clause pro-
vided a more appropriate grounding for the doctrine.118
This jurisprudential migration of the ministerial exception 
away from the Free Exercise Clause and toward—although not 
exclusively under—the Establishment Clause further rein-
forced the jurisdictional conception of the religion clauses.
  
119 As 
Lupu and Tuttle note, Smith did not lead to judicial rejection of 
the ministerial exception120—far from it.121
 
 113. Id. 
 Instead, courts and 
 114. See, e.g., Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 205–06 (2d Cir. 2008); 
Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1042 (7th Cir. 2006); 
Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299, 1304 
(11th Cir. 2000); Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 
948 (9th Cir. 1999); Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 
F.2d 360, 363 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 115. See Laycock, Church Autonomy Revisited, supra note 68, at 264. 
 116. Id. at 262. 
 117. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 17, at 131. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Kalscheur, supra note 13, at 63–69 (describing this shift toward ex-
plaining the ministerial exception as based upon the Establishment Clause). 
 120. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 17, at 131. 
 121. See, e.g., Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home, 363 F.3d 299, 306 n.7 (4th 
Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s intervening decision in [Smith] has not ab-
rogated the ministerial exception.”); Bryce v. Episcopal Church, 289 F.3d 648, 
657 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he ministerial exception cases . . . extend[] beyond 
the specific ministerial exception to the church autonomy doctrine generally, 
and we . . . find that the church autonomy doctrine remains viable after 
Smith.”); Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 
1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2000) (“We conclude the ministerial exception to Title 
VII survives the Supreme Court’s holding in Smith.”); EEOC v. Roman Catho-
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scholars looked to the church property cases, from Watson v. 
Jones through Jones v. Wolf, to locate the ministerial exception 
within the larger framework of church autonomy as opposed to 
simply seeing the ministerial exception as another form of reli-
gious accommodation.122
This relocation also came along with a whole new analytic 
framework. Doctrines like the ministerial exception were not 
aimed at creating exceptions for religious institutions from fa-
cially neutral and generally applicable laws; to the contrary, 
doctrines like the ministerial exception were premised on the 
exclusive jurisdiction of religious institutions to govern their 
own internal religious affairs.
  
123 Put differently, religious insti-
tutions did not need exceptions from laws impacting the hiring 
and firing of ministers because government did not, so to speak, 
have the jurisdiction to pass laws that trespassed on the exclu-
sive right of religious institutions to select ministers, interpret 
religious doctrine, and impose religious discipline on their 
members.124
 
lic Diocese, 213 F.3d 795, 800 n.* (4th Cir. 2000) (“All circuits to have ad-
dressed the question have recognized the continuing vitality of the [ministeri-
al] exception after the Supreme Court’s decision in [Smith] . . . .”. (citation 
omitted)); Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist 
Church, 173 F.3d 343, 349 (5th Cir. 1999) (“We concur wholeheartedly with 
the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion that Smith . . . did not purport to overturn a cen-
tury of precedent protecting the church against governmental interference in 
selecting its ministers.”); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 462 
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[W]e disagree with appellants’ conclusion that Smith re-
quires the rejection of the ministerial exception.”); Bogan v. Miss. Conference 
of United Methodist Church, 433 F. Supp. 2d 762, 766 (S.D. Miss. 2006) (find-
ing the ministerial exception survived Smith). 
  
 122. See, e.g., Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 
90 N.C. L. REV. 1, 58 (2011) (“Smith is a free exercise case. But the ministerial 
exception is grounded just as much in disestablishment concerns as in free ex-
ercise.”); see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 17, at 135–37 (arguing that the 
ministerial exception derives from the Establishment Clause).  
 123. See supra note 13 and accompanying text; see also Richard W. Gar-
nett, The Political (and Other) Safeguards of Religious Freedom, 32 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1815, 1826–27 (2011) (arguing that post-Smith courts “can and should 
clearly and carefully vindicate the ideas that religious and political authorities 
are distinct, independent, and separate; and that the right to religious free-
dom includes the freedom of religious communities to govern themselves with 
respect to matters of doctrine, discipline, and polity”). 
 124. It is worth noting that the Court in Smith itself appeared—although 
somewhat obliquely—to support the continued vitality of the church property 
cases by citing to them approvingly even as it narrowed the scope of the Free 
Exercise Clause. See Brady, supra note 25, 1637–49; Mark E. Chopko & Mi-
chael F. Moses, Freedom to Be a Church: Confronting Challenges to the Right 
of Church Autonomy, 3 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 387, 404 (2005); Lund, supra 
note 122, at 58–59. 
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In this way, reaction to Smith amplified the turn to a ju-
risdictional conception of church-state relations. Thus, the min-
isterial exception was not a defense to be asserted by a reli-
gious institution against enforcement of an otherwise 
applicable law; Smith undermined an analytical framework 
that spoke in such terms. Post-Smith, the ministerial exception 
was simply a landmark signifying the boundaries of govern-
ment’s jurisdiction. In turn, it made sense to understand the 
ministerial exception as representing a jurisdictional bar to the 
assertion of a court’s authority.  
As a result, Smith further bolstered the jurisdictional ap-
proach to the religion clauses. It encouraged courts and schol-
ars to emphasize the benefits of conceptualizing religious insti-
tutions as jurisdictionally separate from the state125 and to 
explore the benefits of this jurisdictional divide.126
II.  CHURCH AUTONOMY AS CONSTITUTIONALIZED 
ARBITRATION   
 At least until 
footnote four.  
Thus far, this Article has outlined the underlying logic and 
doctrinal developments behind the “jurisdictional” approach to 
the religion clauses. At its core, the jurisdictional approach un-
derstands the religion clauses as fortifying the wall of separa-
tion between church and state with each prohibited from tres-
passing on the authority of the other.127 Doctrinally, this 
framework could be applied in a number of ways. Most notably, 
the jurisdictional approach to the religion clauses understood 
courts as adjudicatively disabled from resolving religious dis-
putes.128
 
 125. See supra note 
 Accordingly, even if both parties wanted a court to re-
108 (collecting cases emphasizing the distinction be-
tween Smith’s focus on individual Free Exercise Claims and the rights of reli-
gious institutions that still remained beyond government regulation); supra 
note 13 (collecting articles emphasizing the core jurisdictional underpinning of 
the religion clauses). 
 126. See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 13, at 60–75 (describing how a jurisdic-
tional approach to the Establishment Clause promotes core principles of vol-
untarism and reinforces the limited authority of the state); Kalscheur, supra 
note 13, at 91–97 (describing how a jurisdictional approach to the ministerial 
exception affirmed the penultimacy of the state). 
 127. See supra note 65. 
 128. See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 13, at 28–32 (arguing that the Establish-
ment Clause provides a structural and thereby jurisdictional constraint on 
government intervention in religious affairs); Kalscheur, supra note 13, at 99–
100 (characterizing doctrines such as the ministerial exception as depriving 
courts of subject-matter jurisdiction); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 17, at 122 
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solve their dispute, courts were constitutionally prohibited from 
adjudicating the matter.129
It is against this context that we begin to see the revolu-
tionary—even if inadvertent—impulse in footnote four of Ho-
sanna-Tabor. Without briefing from the parties or discussion 
during oral argument,
 On the jurisdictional account, par-
ties could not wish away the incompetence of courts to adjudi-
cate religious questions. 
130 the Supreme Court held that the min-
isterial exception must be treated by courts not as a jurisdic-
tional bar, but as an affirmative defense. Importantly, doc-
trines serve as jurisdictional bars when they circumscribe a 
court’s authority to hear the dispute submitted;131 by contrast, 
doctrines give rise to affirmative defenses where they speak to 
the merits of the claim, contesting whether the defendant’s “re-
al-world conduct” can provide “a basis for suit” or a basis for le-
gal liability.132
While couched in civil procedure terminology, the Court’s 
holding undermined the growing momentum behind the juris-
dictional approach to the religion clauses. As an affirmative de-
fense, the ministerial exception could be waived, enabling par-
ties to authorize courts to resolve disputes over the 
employment and termination of religious ministers.
 
133
Indeed, footnote four could not be squared with the view 
that courts lack the competence to resolve religious disputes. If 
courts truly were adjudicatively disabled from addressing reli-
gious claims then how could the parties waive claims like the 
ministerial exception? By waiving such claims, courts would be 
authorized to adjudicate the underlying dispute. Such authori-
ty would be impossible if the religion clauses were interpreted 
 In this 
way, casting the ministerial exception as an affirmative defense 
provided courts with an entrée into the regulation of religious 
institutional life—so long as they received an invitation to do 
so. As a result, footnote four appeared to presuppose a far more 
permeable wall of separation between religion and state than 
its jurisdictional predecessor.  
 
(concluding that courts are adjudicatively disabled from resolving disputes 
that turn on religious doctrine or practice). 
 129. See Esbeck, supra note 13, at 42–43. 
 130. See supra note 31. 
 131. See Wasserman, supra note 23, at 1547–48. 
 132. Id. at 1548. 
 133. Indeed, post-Hosanna-Tabor appellate courts have already begun 
holding the ministerial exception waived when not raised by the religious in-
stitution before the trial court. See supra note 34. 
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to support judicial incompetence to resolve religious disputes. 
To the contrary, a jurisdictional view of the religion clauses 
would require courts to raise claims like the ministerial excep-
tion whether or not the parties chose to do so—an option ap-
parently no longer available in the wake of footnote four.  
Not surprisingly, commentators have struggled to under-
stand what theory of the religion clauses might explain the Su-
preme Court’s simultaneous endorsement of church autonomy 
in Hosanna-Tabor and also the Court’s abandonment of the ju-
risdictional paradigm.134 For example, Mark E. Chopko and 
Marissa Parker criticized footnote four as inconsistent with the 
rest of the Court’s opinion in Hosanna-Tabor: “If the ministeri-
al exception reflects [as the Court stated in Hosanna-Tabor] a 
rule that denies to civil magistrates the power to reach ‘an in-
ternal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the 
church itself,’ that issue presents not an affirmative defense, 
but an exercise of ‘competence’ as Watson used the word.”135 Ac-
cordingly, Chopko and Parker simply wish footnote four away: 
“[r]egardless of the label, we think these cases will continue to 
present questions of ‘competence’ and therefore present thresh-
old legal questions.”136
Of course, this is just wishful thinking. Footnote four pre-
sumes an alternative theory underlying the religion clauses—
one that accounts both for the Supreme Court’s endorsement of 
  
 
 134. See Carl H. Esbeck, A Religious Organization’s Autonomy in Matters 
of Self-Governance: Hosanna-Tabor and the First Amendment, 13 ENGAGE 
168, 169 (2012). Esbeck continues to argue that the Establishment Clause 
provides a structural restraint on government intervention in religious insti-
tutional life. Id. However, aware that the Supreme Court has characterized 
the ministerial exception as an affirmative defense, Esbeck contends that judi-
cial inquiry into an assertion of the ministerial exception should be limited to 
the “Is plaintiff a minister” question. Id. at 173 n.33. Esbeck does not address 
questions of waiver.  
 For a discussion of the jurisdictional paradigm in the wake of the footnote 
four of Hosanna-Tabor, see Richard W. Garnett & John M. Robinson, Hosan-
na-Tabor, Religious Freedom, and the Constitutional Structure, in CATO SU-
PREME COURT REVIEW 326–30 (Ilya Shapiro ed. 2012) (arguing that footnote 
four of Hosanna-Tabor is compatible with jurisdictional limitations on judicial 
authority to adjudicate ministerial exception cases); Michael Helfand, The 
New Footnote Four?, CENTER FOR L. & RELIGION (May 25, 2012), http:// 
clrforum.org/2012/05/25/the-new-footnote-4/ (arguing that footnote four of Ho-
sanna-Tabor undermines the jurisdictional approach to the religious clauses); 
Mark Strasser, Footnote Four to the Rescue? Hosanna-Tabor’s Rejection of the 
Institutional Incompetence Argument 8–9 (Mar. 2012) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author). 
 135. Chopko & Parker, supra note 39, at 291. 
 136. Id. 
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church autonomy and for its refusal to adopt the jurisdictional 
approach to the religion clauses.  
In articulating such an alternative theory, we need not 
look further than the Supreme Court’s early church property 
cases, which grounded church autonomy not in the adjudicative 
incompetence of courts but in the affirmative authority granted 
religious institutions to govern the religious life of their mem-
bers.137 In articulating this conception of church autonomy, the 
Supreme Court understood the authority granted religious in-
stitutions as based upon two core principles: first, that the au-
thority of religious institutions derived from the implied con-
sent of its members;138 and, second, that the decisions of 
religious institutions would be reviewed by civil courts for 
“fraud, collusion or arbitrariness.”139 Thus, courts abstained 
from interfering in religious disputes because the members had 
impliedly consented to the authority of the religious institution 
and because courts could still review the decisions of the reli-
gious institution for fraud, misconduct, or other forms of proce-
dural naughtiness.140
To be sure, the early church property cases only provide 
the foundational principles of an alternative view. These prin-
ciples must be fleshed out and applied to contemporary con-
cerns in order to provide a workable method for analyzing the 




 137. See infra Parts II.A–B. 
 But by building a new paradigm 
on these twin principles—consent on the front end and civil 
court review on the back end—the early church property cases 
crafted a framework that largely tracks our longstanding sys-
 138. See infra Part II.A. 
 139. See infra Part II.B. 
 140. See Ira Mark Ellman, Driven from the Tribunal: Judicial Resolution of 
Internal Church Disputes, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1378, 1387 (1981) (describing this 
as Watson’s “contract principle” and noting the relationship between consent 
and review for fraud and collusion). Ellman also claims that the Watson deci-
sion was guided by a principle of “strict deference”—a jurisdictional princi-
ple—which he admits stands in tension with the “contract principle.” Id. at 
1388. However, as I have argued here and elsewhere, Watson’s discussion of 
deference should not be read as precluding the possibility of judicial resolution 
of religious disputes, but as linked to the underlying logic of implied consent. 
Helfand, supra note 55, at 525–29; see also infra note 260 and accompanying 
text. Cf. Kent S. Bernard, Churches, Members, and the Role of the Courts: To-
ward a Contractual Analysis, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 545, 547–59 (1976) (dis-
cussing how principles of arbitration informed early common law conceptions 
of church autonomy);  
 141. See infra Parts II.A.1–3 (providing contemporary applications of the 
implied consent rationale).  
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tem of commercial arbitration.142 Arbitrators draw their author-
ity not from the incompetence of courts, but from the consent of 
the parties to enter an alternative forum for adjudication.143 
And while courts largely refrain from reviewing the substantive 
merits of an arbitrator’s decision,144 courts do patrol arbitration 
proceedings to ensure that decision is not the result of fraud, 
collusion, or other forms of misconduct.145
Importantly, the two principles of consent and review are 
fundamentally linked. It is precisely because parties consent to 
an alternative forum for adjudication that courts must conduct 




 142. Cf. Bernard, supra note 
 If the process does not represent gen-
uine adjudication on the merits, then the resulting decision can 
no longer claim legitimacy on the basis of the consent of the 
140, at 547–52. Bernard argues that princi-
ples of contract and arbitration informed early common law understandings of 
church autonomy. Id. However, Bernard’s article—which predates many of the 
important contemporary church property cases—links these principles to in-
stitutional autonomy by framing institutional authority as based upon explicit 
and implied contracts capable of judicial interpretation without inquiry into 
religious doctrine or practice. Accordingly, Bernard fits his theory within the 
framework of the neutral principles of law approach. See id. at 562–67. As a 
result, Bernard’s view runs contrary to the view advanced in this article. See 
infra Part II.A.3.  
 143. See, e.g., Alan Scott Rau, Everything You Really Need to Know About 
“Separability” in Seventeen Simple Propositions, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 5 
(2002) (describing the assertion that “consent to arbitration is a necessary 
condition of enforcement” as a “truism”). 
 144. See, e.g., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 563 (1976) 
(“[Courts] should not undertake to review the merits of arbitration awards but 
should defer to the tribunal chosen by the parties finally to settle their dis-
putes.”); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 
593, 596 (1960) (“The federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration 
would be undermined if courts had the final say on the merits of the awards.”). 
Indeed, arbitrators are granted wide authority in fashioning equitable resolu-
tions to the disputes submitted before them. See, e.g., Reliastar Life Ins. Co. v. 
EMC Nat’l Life Co., 564 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Where an arbitration 
clause is broad, arbitrators have the discretion to order such remedies as they 
deem appropriate.”). 
 145. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006); see also Dammann, supra note 48, at 470–75 
(2008) (collecting state grounds for vacatur). 
 146. Ellman, supra note 140, at 1391 (“Justice Brandeis’ other qualification 
in Gonzalez—‘in the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness’—also seems 
to follow from the use of contract principles. A court should always be availa-
ble to determine whether an organizational decision has been made in the 
manner contemplated by the agreement, for otherwise the member could not 
be said to be bound by it. Few agreements would contemplate decisions made 
fraudulently or arbitrarily.”); Note, Judicial Intervention in Church Property 
Disputes—Some Constitutional Considerations, 74 YALE L.J. 1113, 1120 (1965) 
(“[T]he consent of the members to be governed by the church authorities did 
not envision fraudulent, arbitrary, or collusive action by these authorities.”). 
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participants. Individuals submit to the authority of another fo-
rum because they seek merits-based adjudication and regula-
tion performed in good faith. Parties do not consent to decision 
making that is corrupted by misconduct.147
Moreover, once we unmoor church autonomy from judicial 
incompetence and instead hitch church autonomy to the con-




In this way, the early church autonomy cases endorsed a 
constitutionalized version of arbitration. The autonomy of reli-
gious institutions derived from implied consent and courts po-
liced the decisions of religious institutions for misconduct.
 If religious institutional authority is grounded in an 
implied agreement between the institution and its members, 
then surely those very same parties can employ that same con-
sent mechanism to authorize courts to resolve intractable reli-
gious disputes. Thus, to conceptualize the ministerial exception 
as an affirmative defense also empowers religious institutions 
and their employees to jointly agree to waive such defenses. 
Like the authority of an arbitrator, institutional autonomy is 
not inherent or mysterious—and it is not based on judicial ina-
bility to resolve the dispute. Footnote four, in understanding 
the ministerial exception as an affirmative defense, opened the 
door for courts to resolve religious disputes at the request of the 
parties. Put differently, church autonomy functions simply as 
an implied arbitration clause where religious institutions are 
impliedly authorized to govern religious matters and resolve re-
ligious disputes. But because such authority is based on con-
sent, religious parties can also opt out.  
149
 
 147. Ellman, supra note 
 
But to understand how these principles might be applied to the 
contemporary dilemmas of church autonomy requires further 
140, at 1391.  
 148. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. 
Ct. 694, 709 n.4 (2012). 
 149. Indeed, even Carl Esbeck has conceded that the implied consent logic 
of Watson does not fit within a jurisdictional approach to the religion clauses. 
Esbeck, supra note 13, at 51 n.208 (“It must be conceded that in one small re-
spect the rationale behind these cases is tied to individual free exercise rights. 
Specifically, the Court implies that when an individual first joins a church, the 
membership arrangement is somewhat like a contract . . . . An implied term of 
that contract is consent to the resolution of any religious disputes that should 
arise by the highest ecclesiastical adjudicatory. Therefore, the Court reasons, 
the dissenting member’s religious rights are not violated when the internal 
resolution of a dispute goes against that member. In all other respects, the 
Court’s rationale is structural.”). 
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elaboration and bringing these principles into more direct con-
versation with principles of arbitration.  
A. IMPLIED CONSENT 
Few concepts have played a more foundational role to the 
political theory of liberalism than consent. Most pronounced in 
early social contract theories,150 philosophers such as John 
Locke151 and Thomas Hobbes152 grounded their theories of polit-
ical legitimacy in consent; on such accounts, it was the consent 
of the governed that rendered government legitimate—a prem-
ise of central importance in the Declaration of Independence as 
well.153
The allure of consent as a cornerstone of political legitima-
cy stemmed from the connection between consent and autono-
my.
 
154 By predicating political and legal authority on the con-
sent of the governed, liberal political theory sought to ensure 
that political and legal obligations remained a function of indi-
vidual choice and not oppression and coercion.155
 
 150. For some of the foundational secondary works addressing the primary 
role of social contract theory in political theories of legitimacy and obligation, 
see generally J.W. GOUGH, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (2d ed. 1967); C.B. 
MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM (1962); 
see also Ernest Barker, Introduction, in SOCIAL CONTRACT i, vii (Ernest Bark-
er ed., 1948).  
  
 151. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 348 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690) (“MEN being, as has been said, by Na-
ture, all free, equal and independent, no one can be put out of this Estate, and 
subjected to the Political Power of another, without his own consent.”). 
 152. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 113 (Michael Oakeshott ed., Basil 
Blackwell 1947) (1651) (“From this institution of a commonwealth are derived 
all the rights, and faculties of him, or them, on whom the sovereign power is 
conferred by the consent of the people assembled.”). 
 153. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“Govern-
ments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent 
of the Governed . . . .”).  
 154. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Consent, Contract, and Territory, 74 MINN. L. 
REV. 1, 21 (1989) (“Consent is a seductive notion because it seems to explain 
obligations in terms of the obligated individual’s voluntary choice.”). That con-
sent can successfully justify political obligation, however, remains a highly 
contested proposition with critics who note that individual choice is often lim-
ited because of historical circumstances and exit costs. See id. at 22−24. For a 
justification of consent theory, see Ilya Somin, Revitalizing Consent, 23 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 753 (2000); see also Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of 
Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 319 (1986) (noting that a consent theory of 
contract places importance on individual will and autonomy, but also promotes 
other principles such as reliance and efficiency).  
 155. Economic theorists also emphasize consent, albeit for a different rea-
son. See Nathan B. Oman, A Pragmatic Defense of Contract Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 
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These considerations of consent and fears of coercion have 
long framed the place of religion and religious associations 
within political liberalism156 and, in particular, the American 
political tradition.157
 
77, 103 (2009) (arguing that economic theorists “tend to defer to consensual 
transactions, not because consent does any justificatory work per se, but ra-
ther because consent is an epistemic marker, an observable indicator that a 
redistribution of resources results in a non-observable increase in welfare”).  
 Most famously, John Locke defined the 
very essence of a church as “a voluntary society of men, joining 
 156. See supra note 150. Of course, liberalism––and especially classical lib-
eralism––has endured significant criticism for its reliance on unproblematized 
principles of voluntarism. Some of this criticism has come from feminist schol-
ars who have emphasized that voluntarism’s presumption of exit is dubious. 
See, e.g., SEYLA BENHABIB, THE CLAIMS OF CULTURE: EQUALITY AND DIVERSI-
TY IN THE GLOBAL ERA 82−104 (2002) (discussing cases in which multicultural 
associations often work to the detriment of women); SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, IS 
MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 7−24 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999) 
(arguing that multicultural group rights tend to reinforce subordination of 
women due to inequalities within the groups themselves); AYELET SHACHAR, 
MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND WOMEN’S 
RIGHTS 60–63 (2001). 
 Another prominent criticism of voluntarism has come from so-called 
communitarian political theorists who have contended that liberalism as-
sumes the priority of the individual instead of recognizing that individual 
identity is tightly bound to social and cultural contexts––a fact that under-
mines claims of voluntary association. See, e.g., ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER 
VIRTUE 204−25 (3d ed. 2007) (discussing the role of traditions and virtues in 
forming individual identities); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCON-
TENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 1−24 (1996) (discussing 
the public philosophy of contemporary liberalism); CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES 
OF THE SELF 185−98, 502−06 (1989) (discussing the complex conceptions of 
modern identity); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 31–63 (1983) (argu-
ing that group membership structures all of our individual choices); 2 
CHARLES TAYLOR, Atomism, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 187, 
205 (1985) (“[T]he free individual or autonomous moral agent can only achieve 
and maintain his identity in a certain type of culture . . . .”); Michael J. Sandel, 
The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, 12 POL. THEORY 81, 
90−91 (1984) (“To imagine a person incapable of constitutive attachments . . . 
is not to conceive an ideally free and rational agent, but to imagine a person 
wholly without character, without moral depth . . . . Denied the expansive self-
understandings that could shape a common life, the liberal self is left to lurch 
between detachment on the one hand, and entanglement on the other.”).  
 157. See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 13, at 63−67 (discussing the centrality of 
voluntarism in Establishment Clause jurisprudence); Noah Feldman, The In-
tellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 348–51 
(2002) (highlighting the role of freedom of conscience and voluntarism in the 
early conceptions of religious freedom and the religion clauses); David C. Wil-
liams & Susan H. Williams, Volitionalism and Religious Liberty, 76 CORNELL 
L. REV. 769, 853−58 (1991) (describing the role of volition in the writings of 
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison on religion and religious liberty).  
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themselves together of their own accord”158—a formulation sub-
sequently echoed by Thomas Jefferson.159
It is therefore not surprising that the Supreme Court’s ear-
ly church property cases built on this framework of consent and 
voluntarism.
  
160 In its 1871 decision Watson v. Jones, the Su-
preme Court noted “[t]hat in so far as the law can regard them, 
the powers of the church judicatories are derived solely from 
the consent of the members of the church.”161 Similarly, in its 
1929 decision Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, the Su-
preme Court explicitly grounded church autonomy in the con-
sent of the religious institution’s members, holding that “the 
decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters purely ec-
clesiastical . . . are accepted in litigation before the secular 
courts as conclusive, because the parties in interest made them 
so by contract or otherwise.”162
And yet, Watson and Gonzalez do not employ the generic 
language of consent. Instead, in language unreflectively incor-
porated into subsequent Supreme Court decisions,
  
163 Watson 
and Gonzalez predicate the authority of religious institutions 
on implied consent.164 The shift to implied consent, of course, is 
not novel. Political philosophers from John Locke165
 
 158. See JOHN LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in THE SECOND 
TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 129 
(J. W. Gough ed., 1947) (1689). 
 to John 
 159. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, Notes on Religion, in 2 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 101 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1893) (1776). 
 160. See Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 
16−17 (1929); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871). 
 161. Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 710. 
 162. Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 16. The court continued by noting that “[u]nder 
like circumstances, effect is given in the courts to the determinations of the 
judicatory bodies established by clubs and civil associations.” Id. at 16−17. 
 163. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. 
EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 713 (2012) (quoting significantly from Watson, includ-
ing the “implied consent” language); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 617 (1979) 
(same); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 711 (1976) 
(same); Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l 
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 446 (1969) (same). 
 164. Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 16−17 (referencing the implied consent of Wat-
son); Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 729 (introducing the concept of implied con-
sent). 
 165. LOCKE, supra note 151, at 366 (“And to this I say, that every Man, 
that hath any Possession, or Enjoyment, of any part of the Dominions of any 
Government, doth thereby give his tacit consent, and is as far forth obliged to 
Obedience to the Laws of that Government, during such Enjoyment, as any 
one under it . . . .”). 
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Rawls166 have deployed various forms of tacit or hypothetical 
consent in order to avoid some of the problems of basing politi-
cal obligation on actual consent—most notably, that there rare-
ly is actual consent on the part of those governed.167
But grounding the authority of religious organizations in 
the implied consent of their members does say something sig-
nificant about the nature of church autonomy. In the words of 
Watson, “All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an 
implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to 
it.”
  
168 Thus, according to the Watson Court, those who join a 
church or other religious institution recognize that becoming a 
member entails implicitly authorizing the institution to self-
govern and resolve internal disputes.169 The rationale for this 
implied consent is directly tied to the substantive objectives of 
religious institutions: “It is of the essence of these religious un-
ions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of 
questions arising among themselves, that those decisions 
should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, sub-
ject only to such appeals as the organism itself provides for.”170
In advancing this claim, Watson built upon an argument 
tracing back to the founding period
 
The key here is Watson’s argument for the unique role of im-
plied consent in the context of religious institutions—as op-
posed to secular associations—which links the reason why in-
dividuals join religious institutions to the authority of religious 
institutions to self-govern.  
171 and, in turn, to John 
Locke.172
 
 166. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (1971) (“It is understood as a 
purely hypothetical situation characterized so as to lead to a certain concep-
tion of justice.”). 
 Indeed, it was Locke who explicitly connected the vol-
 167. For further discussion of some of the problems posed by tacit consent, 
see A. John Simmons, Tacit Consent and Political Obligation, 5 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 274, 275–76 (1976). See also John Dunn, Consent in the Political Theory 
of John Locke, 10 HIST. J. 153, 155–57 (1967) (arguing that Locke’s acceptance 
of tacit consent, among other considerations, demonstrates that consent did 
not play as prominent a role in Locke’s theory as typically understood). 
 168. Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 729. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See Williams & Williams, supra note 157, at 853−58 (describing the 
role of volition in the founding era); see also JEFFERSON, supra note 159, at 
101 (noting that individuals join a church “in order to the public worshipping 
of god in such a manner as they judge acceptable to him & effectual to the sal-
vation of their souls . . . . The hope of salvation is the cause of his entering into 
it.”). 
 172. See Feldman, supra note 157, at 378 (“By the late eighteenth century, 
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untary nature of religious institutions to the need for the mem-
bership’s consent to institutional rule-making authority.173 Ac-
cording to Locke, individuals voluntarily join churches to 
achieve “the salvation of their souls,” and this “hope of salva-
tion” serves as the motivation for “members voluntarily unit-
ing” into a church.174 However, Locke notes that in order to ac-
complish such objectives the church must “be regulated by 
some laws, and the members all consent to observe some or-
der.”175 Thus, on Locke’s account, the membership must consent 
to both be “regulated by some laws” and “observe some or-
der”176
Of course, to speak of a need to consent, at first glance, 
smacks of a contradiction; consent rests on notions of volunta-
rism, something that cannot be of necessity.
—what we might see as necessary consent to the regula-
tory and adjudicative authority of a religious institution.  
177 But religious in-
stitutions aim to accomplish a unique set of goals, such as faith 
and salvation, which civil society is ill-suited to achieve. In-
deed, as Locke notes, civil society seeks to “procur[e], 
preserv[e], and advanc[e] . . . civil interests,” such as “life, liber-
ty, health and indolency of body; and the possession of outward 
things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like.”178 
By focusing its efforts and energies on “outward things,” a civil 
society avoids taking sides on how its citizens should lead the 
good life, leaving room for the deep value-pluralism that typi-
fies the liberal nation-state.179
 
some version of Locke’s basic view of the nature of the liberty of conscience 
had been formally embraced by nearly every politically active American writ-
ing on the subject of religion and the state.”); Andrew Koppelman, Corruption 
of Religion and the Establishment Clause, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831, 
1858−60 (2009) (discussing John Locke’s views on church-state relations in the 
context of the founding period); Williams & Williams, supra note 
  
157, at 
857−58 (noting that in defining a church, Jefferson echoed Locke almost ver-
batim); see also infra notes 174−78 and accompanying text. 
 173. See infra notes 174−78 and accompanying text. 
 174. LOCKE, supra note 158, at 129. 
 175. Id. Examples of such necessary rules include “[p]lace and time of 
meeting . . . rules for admitting and excluding members . . . distinction of offic-
ers, and putting things into a regular course.” Id.  
 176. Id.  
 177. See, e.g., Brilmayer, supra note 154, at 21 (noting that consent “ex-
plains obligation in terms of . . . voluntary choice”). 
 178. LOCKE, supra note 158, at 129. 
 179. The association between modern political liberalism and pluralism is 
most frequently associated with John Rawls. See generally JOHN RAWLS, PO-
LITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). 
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By contrast, religious associations are formed in order to 
pursue a particular conception of the good life, tied up in specif-
ic notions of faith and salvation. To use Locke’s phrasing, “eve-
ry one joins himself voluntarily to that society in which he be-
lieves he has found that profession and worship which is truly 
acceptable to God.”180 Thus, religious associations form precise-
ly because their membership hopes to pursue a particular reli-
gious path. This is not a goal that civil society aims to accom-
plish; liberal civil society simply does not aim to regulate and 
adjudicate in order to promote particular conceptions of faith 
and salvation.181 Indeed, members of religious communities 
would likely view such intervention from civil society with deep 
skepticism. Members of religious associations typically see civil 
society as without authority to provide rules and resolves dis-
putes over matters that turn on religious doctrine or practice.182 
This is because joining a particular religious association fre-
quently entails granting authority over religious matters to the 
religious institution.183
 
 180. LOCKE, supra note 158, at 129. 
 Indeed, it might be seen as contradictory 
to join a religious community, but to maintain that promulga-
tion, interpretation and application of the relevant religious 
doctrine to be within the purview of the secular nation-state.  
 181. To be sure, noting that civil society is ill-suited or does not aim to 
achieve religious ends does not conflict with a rejection of the jurisdictional 
paradigm that claims courts are incapable of resolving religious disputes. To 
claim that civil society does not pursue religious ends speaks to its desire to 
promote alternative goals, such as, for example, religious pluralism. Put dif-
ferently, claiming that civil society is ill-suited to pursue religious ends is 
simply a statement of what civil society desires to accomplish as opposed to 
what it could accomplish. By contrast, versions of the jurisdictional paradigm 
grounded in adjudicative disability see courts as incapable of resolving dis-
putes over religious doctrine even when motivated to do so by the request of 
the parties. See supra notes 134–36 and accompanying text.  
 182. See supra notes 14−15 and accompanying text (conceptualizing the 
competing jurisdictions of church and state as dual sovereigns). 
 183. Some religious groups would discourage, and even condemn, submit-
ting disputes to secular courts as an offense against the religious authorities 
within the given religious community. See, e.g., Michael A. Helfand, Religious 
Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting Legal Or-
ders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231, 1243–52 (2011) (discussing the aversion to secu-
lar adjudication in Jewish and Islamic Law). Indeed, this precise issue stood at 
the center of the controversy between the parties in Hosanna-Tabor. See Ho-
sanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 
700 (2012) (noting that Hosanna-Tabor’s grounds for terminating Perich in-
cluded “the damage she had done to her ‘working relationship’ with the school 
by ‘threatening to take legal action’” (citation omitted)). 
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While religious communities and associations vary in their 
notions of rules and authority, the Watson Court built its theo-
ry of church autonomy on the assumption that by joining a reli-
gious community, the members impliedly consented to the 
community’s authority over promulgating religious rules and 
adjudicating religious disputes. As the Court explained, “it 
would be a vain consent and would lead to the total subversion 
of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their de-
cisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them re-
versed.”184
To be sure, this inference only made sense in the context of 
religious institutions as opposed to their secular counterparts. 
Watson presumed that individuals who join religious communi-
ties see civil society as ill-suited to promote the pursuit of faith 
and salvation. Moreover, selecting a particular religious associ-
ation, and thereby choosing a particular conception of faith and 
salvation, frequently entails an underlying submission of reli-
gious matters to the sovereignty of the community’s religious 
authorities. As put by the Watson Court, “All who unite them-
selves to such a body do so with an implied consent to this gov-
ernment, and are bound to submit to it.”
  
185
In this way, implied consent simultaneously captured the 
voluntary nature of joining a religious institution and the im-
plicit submission to the institution’s regulatory and adjudica-
tive authority over the religious sphere. Thus, on the one hand, 
religious institutions remain undeniably voluntary in origin.
 
186 
However, religious institutions also aim to accomplish a unique 
set of goals––such as faith and salvation––which civil society is 
ill-suited to achieve. Accordingly, in order to accomplish the re-
ligious objectives of faith and salvation, membership also re-
quires vesting rule-making and adjudicative authority within 
the religious institution. Indeed, Locke worried that without 
granting religious institutions this authority, the 
“church . . . will presently dissolve and break in pieces.”187
Thus, by relying on implied consent, the Watson Court ar-
ticulated a theory of church autonomy that was, on the one 
hand, individualistic and yet, on the other hand, also provided 
religious institutions with significant authority. At its core, a 
  
 
 184. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871). 
 185. Id. 
 186. See Laycock, Church Autonomy, supra note 68, at 1405 (“Voluntary 
affiliation with the group is the premise on which group autonomy depends.”). 
 187. LOCKE, supra note 158, at 129.  
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religious institution’s authority derives from the consent of the 
members.188 At the same time, the Watson Court established a 
default rule that allowed courts to presume individual mem-
bers had consented to the self-governing and adjudicative au-
thority of religious institutions in the absence of actual con-
sent.189 In this way, the Watson Court provided religious 
institutions with a sphere of jurisdiction or sovereignty, but 
grounded this authority on voluntaristic principles.190
It is here where we begin to see how early understandings 
of church autonomy tracked the arbitration model. Like the 
Watson Court’s model of church autonomy, arbitration is fun-
damentally voluntaristic; that is, an arbitrator’s authority de-
rives from the consent of the parties.
 
191 The parties choose to 
exit the realm of judicial adjudication and select instead a new 
forum for alternative dispute resolution. Thus, the adjudicative 
authority of arbitrators is not inherent and it does not derive 
from the inability of courts to resolve a particular claim; like 
Watson’s version of church autonomy, it is adjudicative authori-
ty that derives from the consent of the parties.192
Beyond its voluntaristic foundations, arbitration doctrine 
also makes use, at times, of implied consent in order to effectu-
ate the overall goals of arbitration. Thus, as part of consenting 
to the arbitrator’s authority, parties implicitly and by necessity 
grant the arbitrator power to decide any number of procedural 
  
 
 188. See supra notes 171−75 and accompanying text (discussing the role of 
consent in religion). 
 189. On this point, the argument presented differs in an important way 
from the argument in Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Re-
ligious Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=2152060. Like Schwartzman & Schragger, I locate the au-
thority of religious institutions in the consent of the members. However, un-
like Schwartzman & Schragger, I endorse the Watson Court’s heuristic of im-
plied consent, which provides religious institutions with a wide range of 
authority because of the default presumption that individuals transfer auton-
omy of religious matters to religious institutions as a function of joining the 
institution’s membership. 
 190. Indeed, in many ways, this analytic move tracks John Locke’s own po-
litical theory, which employed tacit consent in order to justify political obliga-
tion in circumstances where actual consent was an impossibility. LOCKE, su-
pra note 151, at 365−66. Locke’s theory of tacit consent, not surprisingly, has 
been much maligned. See Dunn, supra note 167, at 155 (arguing that Locke’s 
acceptance of tacit consent, among other considerations, demonstrates that 
consent did not play as prominent a role in Locke’s theory as typically under-
stood); Simmons, supra note 167, at 288 (arguing that “none of Locke’s ‘con-
sent-implying enjoyments’ is in fact a genuine consensual act”). 
 191. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 192. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
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matters,193 all necessary to ensuring that the arbitrator can ac-
complish the primary goal of the arbitration: to effectively and 
efficiently resolve the dispute of the parties.194
In addition, if doubts arise as to the scope of the issues 
submitted to arbitration, courts resolve such doubts in favor of 
arbitration; the rationale for this rule is not simply based on 
standard principles of contract interpretation, but because the 
substantive policies favoring arbitration enable courts to imply 
the consent of the parties where the agreement is ambiguous.
  
195
That implied consent plays a significant role in both church 
autonomy and commercial arbitration should not be surprising. 
Both contexts involve the granting of adjudicative authority 
over a circumscribed scope of substantive matters that would 
otherwise be resolved in court. However, the actual consent of 
  
 
 193. See, e.g., Finley Lines Joint Protective Bd. Unit 200 v. Norfolk S. Ry. 
Co., 312 F.3d 943, 947 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Arbitrators have broad procedural dis-
cretion.” (citing Gunther v. San Diego & Ariz. E. Ry., 382 U.S. 257, 262–63 
(1965))); Nordahl Dev. Corp. v. Salomon Smith Barney, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 
1265 (D. Or. 2004) (“[A]rbitrators have wide discretion in making procedural 
decisions.”); see also IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: 
AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION 
ACT § 34.1 (1994) (describing the discretion exercised by arbitrators in the 
realm of discovery); Barbara Black, The Irony of Securities Arbitration Today: 
Why Do Brokerage Firms Need Judicial Protection?, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 415, 
433 (2003) (“Arbitrators have broad discretion in managing the arbitration 
process, and procedural defects are not grounds for vacating an award so long 
as the arbitration process was ‘fundamentally fair.’”).  
 194. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 
626 (1985) (“The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, 
any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in fa-
vor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the con-
tract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to 
arbitrability.” (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 
460 U.S. 1, 24−25 (1983)).  
 195. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995) 
(“And, given the law’s permissive policies in respect to arbitration . . . one can 
understand why the law would insist upon clarity before concluding that the 
parties did not want to arbitrate a related matter.”). It is also worth noting 
that implied consent animates the doctrine of separability—which allows 
courts to “separate out” and enforce arbitration provisions contained in 
agreements whose very validity is being challenged. See Richard C. Reuben, 
First Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of Separability: Restor-
ing Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration Provisions, 56 SMU L. REV. 
819, 849–51 (2003) (describing and criticizing the role of implied consent in 
arbitration doctrine). That is, courts enforce the arbitration provision on the 
assumption that given the existence of the provision, the parties would have 
also submitted challenges regarding the contract’s validity to arbitrators as 
well. See, e.g., Ware, Employment Arbitration, supra note 48, at 131 (“[T]he 
separability doctrine pretends that the party also alleges a fictional contract 
consisting of just the arbitration clause, but no other terms.”). 
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the parties—whether when joining the membership of a reli-
gious institution or selecting an arbitrator to resolve disputes—
frequently fails to explicitly address questions regarding the 
scope of authority granted.196
Relying on Watson’s implied consent doctrine provides a 
framework for church autonomy that employs principles of vol-
untarism in answering questions of scope. Indeed, the implied 
consent framework can provide such guidance because it does 
not link the authority of religious institutions to the incompe-
tence of courts to address religious questions, but instead 
grounds such authority in the implicit consent that comes along 
with membership in religious institutions.  
 Thus for both church autonomy 
and arbitration, implied consent fills the gap, serving as a doc-
trine that expands the scope of the authority or autonomy 
granted in order to promote the parties’ underlying purpose.  
Of course, once we locate church autonomy within an im-
plied consent framework, the Supreme Court’s attempts in Ho-
sanna-Tabor to distinguish the ministerial exception from indi-
vidual claims for accommodation is far more comprehensible.197 
Under an implied consent framework, individual claims for ac-
commodation look nothing like institutional claims for autono-
my.198
 
 196. See Ware, Employment Arbitration, supra note 
 Institutions retain a sphere of autonomy to make reli-
gious rules and resolve religious disputes because they have 
been implicitly granted this right by their membership. In rais-
ing doctrines like the ministerial exception, they do not seek an 
exception from an otherwise generally applicable and facially 
neutral rule; religious institutions simply aim to enforce the 
implied agreement between themselves and their membership 
48, at 131 (“[I]mposing 
duties based on speculations about what the parties would have voluntarily 
consented to is profoundly different from imposing duties based on what the 
parties did, in fact, voluntarily consent to.”). 
 197. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. 
Ct. 694, 707 (2012) (“Smith involved government regulation of only outward 
physical acts. The present case, in contrast, concerns government interference 
with an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the 
church itself.”). 
 198. This claim differs from the distinction some courts have drawn be-
tween individual claims for accommodation and the constitutional rights of 
religious institutions. See supra notes 108−10 and accompanying text. The im-
plied consent framework differentiates between individual and institutional 
constitutional claims because institutional claims function as a form of forum 
selection clause whereby institutions are granted authority over a sphere of 
claims by the consent of their membership. 
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whereby they were granted the authority to adjudicate and 
govern the religious life of their community.  
In this way, Hosanna-Tabor accurately described that 
which differentiates doctrines like the ministerial exception 
from individual claims for accommodation: they protect reli-
gious institutions from “interference with an internal church 
decision that affects the faith and mission of the church it-
self.”199 As a result, the Court’s holding in Smith that the Free 
Exercise Clause does not require government to provide indi-
viduals with accommodations from otherwise valid laws tells us 
little about to what extent government can intrude on the au-
tonomy of religious institutions.200 Such autonomy does not de-
rive from simple claims of accommodation; institutions retain 
such autonomy through the implied consent of their members 
who—joining together in the pursuit of faith and salvation—
grant the institution authority because it is the institution it-
self that is uniquely capable of addressing core religious mat-
ters.201
Framed in this way, the implied consent model focuses our 
attention on the circumstances that allow us to presume that 
the membership of a religious institution has impliedly con-
sented to that institution’s authority over religious matters. In 
turn, when inquiring whether the church autonomy doctrine 
ought to cover a particular set of circumstances, the implied 
consent model asks whether—given the nature of the parties,
  
202 
the relationship between the parties and the religious institu-
tions,203 and the substances of the dispute204
1. The Nature of the Parties: What Is a Church? 
—we can conclude 
that the parties impliedly consented to the adjudicative and 
rule-making authority of the religious institution. To better 
understand how this model would apply to contemporary con-
flicts over the scope of the church autonomy doctrine, consider 
the following examples. 
As described above, the “ministerial exception” exempts 
the employment relationship between “religious institutions” 
and their “ministers” from compliance with various employ-
 
 199. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707. 
 200. See supra notes 162–84 and accompanying text. 
 201. See supra notes 162–84 and accompanying text. 
 202. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 203. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 204. See infra Part II.A.3. 
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ment statutes.205 While judicial inquiry into the definition of a 
minister has received significant attention,206 the contours of 
what constitutes a religious institution have been largely left 
unexplored with limited case law addressing the question.207
An examination of the few decisions addressing what con-
stitutes a religious institution for the purposes of the First 
Amendment uncovers two primary types of considerations. On 
the one hand, courts often explore the underlying structure of 
the institution in order to determine whether it is religious in 
nature. For example, in Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presby-
terian Hospitals, the Eighth Circuit considered whether the de-
fendant, a hospital, should be considered a religious institution 
for the purposes of the ministerial exception.
  
208 In answering 
the question in the affirmative, the court highlighted among 
other considerations that “[t]he hospital’s Board of Directors 
consists of four church representatives and their unanimously 
agreed-upon nominees”209 and the hospital’s “Articles of Associ-
ation may be amended only with the approval of the Episcopal 
Diocese of Missouri of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the 
United States of America and the local Presbytery of the Pres-
byterian Church (U.S.A.).”210
Similarly, in Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater 
Washington, the Fourth Circuit noted that the defendant’s “By-
Laws define it as a religious and charitable non-profit corpora-
tion and declare that its mission is to provide elder care to 
‘aged of the Jewish faith in accordance with the precepts of 
Jewish law and customs.’”
  
211 Using such corporate hallmarks in 
order to define an institution as religious seems reasonable if 
the underlying theory behind the ministerial exception is juris-
dictional; where an institution is of objective religious charac-
ter, then it should be granted inherent autonomy.212
 
 205. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 705 (noting uniform acceptance 
of the “ministerial exception” by federal courts of appeals); Alcazar v. Corp. of 
the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288, 1290 (9th Cir. 2010); Bryce 
v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 655 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 However, if 
 206. For further discussion, see infra Part III.A. 
 207. Cf. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 
299, 309–10 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting the lack of authority on the issue in Fourth 
Circuit precedent). 
 208. Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 
362 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 310. 
 212. See, e.g., Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A 
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we approach such questions under an implied-consent frame-
work, then our inquiry must focus less on the corporate struc-
ture of the institution and more on the extent to which the reli-
gious character of the institution was open and obvious to its 
employees. For example, the court in Shaliehsabou also em-
phasized various ways in which the defendant conducted busi-
ness such that it would be obvious to an employee that the in-
stitution was religious, explaining that “the Hebrew Home 
maintained a rabbi on its staff, employed mashgichim to ensure 
compliance with the Jewish dietary laws, and placed a mezu-
zah on every resident’s doorpost.”213 Building on this type of 
analysis, a number of courts have described the touchstone of 
the “religious institution” inquiry as whether the “entity’s mis-
sion is marked by clear or obvious religious characteristics.”214
Focusing on the extent to which an institution’s mission is 
manifested in ways “clear” and “obvious” to its employees is vi-
tal from the perspective of implied consent. In order to conclude 
that an employee has impliedly consented to the authority of 
the religious institution, there first must be evidence that the 
employee was on notice regarding the religious character of the 
institution. While explicitly stating the mission of an institu-
tion in by-laws and the like does place indications of the insti-
tution’s religious character in the public domain, it provides 
somewhat shaky grounds to support an inference that an em-
ployee would have impliedly consented to the institution’s rule-
making and adjudicative authority.  
 
Individuals consent to a religious institution’s autonomy 
because they recognize that the substantive religious aims of 
the institution are such that they require granting the institu-
tion expanded autonomy. But without sufficient indication that 
an employee was aware of the institution’s unique religious 
characteristics and objectives, it is difficult to find implied con-
sent. For this reason, an implied consent model of church au-
 
Critical Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1514, 1539–40 (1979) (arguing that where a “church acts outside this 
epicenter and moves closer to the purely secular world [engaging in] church-
sponsored community activities, such as adoption agencies, homes for the aged 
[and] hospitals[,] it subjects itself to secular regulation proportionate to the 
degree of secularity of its activities and relationships. A church acting outside 
the epicenter may still enjoy some degree of first amendment protection, but 
its claims may be evaluated in light of competing, and perhaps more weighty, 
general societal interests.”). 
 213. 363 F.3d at 310. 
 214. Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225–26 (6th Cir. 
2007); Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 310. 
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tonomy focuses more naturally on whether the religious charac-
ter of an institution was clear and obvious to its employees and 
not simply whether the religious character of the institution 
can be located on paper.  
2. The Relationship Between the Parties: Shunning 
Another important context where church autonomy can 
serve as a shield to liability is the practice of some religious 
communities to “shun members of their religious communities 
for failing to abide by shared religious rules of conduct.”215 Such 
shunning typically “involves the complete withdrawal of social, 
spiritual, and economic contact from a member or former mem-
ber of a religious group.”216
Some victims of shunning have responded to coordinated 
communal shunning by filing suit, alleging torts such as defa-
mation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. By and 
large, such lawsuits have been dismissed on church autonomy 
grounds.
  
217 As articulated by the Ninth Circuit, “[c]hurches are 
afforded great latitude when they impose discipline . . . . 
‘[R]eligious activities which concern only members of the faith 
are and ought to be free—as nearly absolutely free as anything 
can be.’”218
These general trends notwithstanding, courts remain di-
vided over whether church autonomy provides a shield against 
institutional liability only for conduct initiated against a plain-




 215. Michael A. Helfand, Fighting for the Debtor’s Soul: Regulating Reli-
gious Commercial Conduct, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 157, 181 (2011). 
 or even for 
conduct initiated against a plaintiff who has withdrawn from 
 216. Miller, supra note 9, at 272. 
 217. See generally Annotation, Suspension or Expulsion from Church or 
Religious Society and the Remedies Therefor, 20 A.L.R.2d 435–36 (1951) (col-
lecting cases stressing religious liberty as a basis for limiting jurisdiction); see 
also Helfand, supra note 215, at 181; Miller, supra note 9, at 287. 
 218. Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y, 819 F.2d 875, 883 (9th Cir. 
1987) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 177 (1944) (Jackson, J., 
concurring)). 
 219. See, e.g., Paul, 819 F.2d at 883; Sands v. Living Word Fellowship, 34 
P.3d 955, 956–59 (Alaska 2001) (holding that shunning practices are protected 
by the First Amendment in the context of a suit against non-church members); 
see also Anderson v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y, No. M2004-01066-COA-
R9-CV, 2007 WL 161035, at *19 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2007) (holding that 
“[s]hunning is religiously based conduct, a religious practice based on inter-
pretation of scripture, and is subject to the protection of the First Amendment” 
and not differentiating between conduct committee pre-disfellowship and post-
disfellowship). 
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the religious community.220 Courts that have extended First 
Amendment protection to include shunning of former members 
or non-members of a church have largely done so by arguing 
that the churches have inherent authority to engage in core re-
ligious activity.221 Moreover, some of the more expansive formu-
lations of the First Amendment protections provided for shun-
ning-related conduct have relied upon the jurisdictional bar 
against judicial interrogation of religious doctrine or practice.222
By contrast, the courts that have refused to interpret the 
First Amendment to shield institutions for shunning-related 
conduct against former or non-church members have empha-





 220. See, e.g., Smith v. Calvary Christian Church, 592 N.W.2d 713, 718 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1998), rev’d, Smith v. Calvary Christian Church, 614 N.W.2d 
590, 595 (Mich. 2000) (holding that plaintiff’s conduct evidenced his implied 
consent to the church’s practices); Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 559 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1987) (en banc) (holding the First Amendment could shield a pastor 
from claims of defamation against members of his church, but not against non-
members); Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766, 786 (Okla. 
1989) (holding that pre-withdrawal discipline was not actionable because 
plaintiff had consented to such conduct, post-withdrawal discipline was ac-
tionable). 
 For example, the Supreme Court of Okla-
 221. Paul, 819 F.2d at 883 (broadly construing the First Amendment to 
provide “great latitude” for the imposition of religious discipline); Sands, 34 
P.3d at 958–59 (holding that the First Amendment shields shunning practices 
from liability because such practices are religiously based, deeply rooted in re-
ligious belief and motivated––at least in the instant case––by sincere religious 
belief).  
 222. See, e.g., Anderson, 2007 WL 161035, at *30 (“If, to resolve [a] particu-
lar claim brought, a court would need to resolve underlying controversies over 
religious doctrine, then the claim is precluded.”); see also Klagsbrun v. Va’ad 
Harabonim, 53 F. Supp. 2d 732, 742 (D.N.J. 1999) (holding that the defendant 
could not be found liable for religious defamation because “the Establishment 
Clause is implicated whenever courts must interpret, evaluate, or apply un-
derlying religious doctrine to resolve disputes involving religious organiza-
tions”). 
 223. Smith, 592 N.W.2d at 718 (quoting Guinn’s logic); Hester, 723 S.W.2d 
at 559 (quoting Rosicrucian Fellowship v. Rosicrucian Nonsectarian Church, 
245 P.2d 481, 487–88 (Cal. 1952)) (“It is perfectly clear that, whatever church 
relationship is maintained in the United States, is not a matter of status. It is 
based . . . on voluntary consent . . . it is ‘one of contract,’ and is therefore exact-
ly what the parties to it make it and nothing more. A person who joins a 
church covenants expressly or impliedly that in consideration of the benefits 
which result from such a union he will submit to its control and be governed 
by its laws, usages and customs whether they are of an ecclesiastical or tem-
poral character to which laws, usages, and customs he assents as to so many 
stipulations of a contract.”); Guinn, 775 P.2d at 779 (“Only those ‘who unite 
themselves’ in a religious association impliedly consent to its authority over 
them and are ‘bound to submit to it.’ Parishioner voluntarily joined the 
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homa held that the First Amendment could shield a church 
from liability related to shunning only against members.224 
Thus, the court noted, “[b]y voluntarily uniting with the 
church, [the plaintiff] impliedly consented to submitting to its 
form of religious government.”225 In turn, explained the court, a 
religious institution’s autonomy is both tied to and circum-
scribed by the underlying logic of implied consent: “Only those 
‘who unite themselves’ in a religious association impliedly con-
sent to its authority over them and are ‘bound to submit to 
it.’”226 As a result, the court concluded, the plaintiff “voluntarily 
joined the Church of Christ and by so doing consented to sub-
mit to its tenets.”227 However, “[w]hen she later removed herself 
from membership, [the plaintiff] withdrew her consent, depriv-
ing the Church of the power actively to monitor her spiritual 
life through overt disciplinary acts.”228
Of course, it may sometimes be hard to determine whether 
a plaintiff has withdrawn her consent and thereby undermined 
an institution’s ability to deploy the First Amendment as a 
shield to liability.
 
229 Moreover, it is sometimes difficult to de-
termine for how long a religious institution can continue to im-
pose religious discipline after excommunicating a member.230
 
Church of Christ and by so doing consented to submit to its tenets. When she 
later removed herself from membership, Parishioner withdrew her consent, 
depriving the Church of the power actively to monitor her spiritual life 
through overt disciplinary acts.”). 
 
But what is clear is that a theory of church autonomy that 
grounds the authority of religious institutions in the implied 
consent of its member is deeply skeptical of applying the doc-
trine where the individual has explicitly chosen to withdraw 
from the religious community. Where the relationship between 
 224. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 777. 
 225. Id. at 779. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Indeed this is precisely the grounds for the Michigan Supreme Court’s 
reversal in Smith v. Calvary Christian Church, 614 N.W.2d 590 (Mich. 2000), 
where the court reversed the Michigan Court of Appeals decision because it 
found that Plaintiff’s conduct evidenced his continued implied consent to the 
church’s practices even though he was not a member of the church. 
 230. Anderson v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y, No. M2004-01066-COA-
R9-CV, 2007 WL 161035, at *27 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2007) (noting that 
“[w]hen a person voluntarily joins a religious organization and submits to its 
governance, that person consents to the final decision by that organization’s 
tribunals without recourse to civil courts. That consent includes consequences 
of church discipline that flow from the expulsion process.” (emphasis added)). 
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the individual and the community has been severed, there can 
no longer be a claim of implied consent and therefore no claim 
of church autonomy.231
3. The Substance of the Dispute: Neutral Principles 
 
As discussed above, the jurisdictional approach to the reli-
gion clauses is tightly linked to a view that the courts are in-
competent to resolve religious disputes.232 In turn, it is because 
courts relinquish jurisdiction over religious disputes that reli-
gious institutions are granted autonomy over religious disputes 
free from judicial interference.233
Few doctrines capture this impulse more than the “neutral 
principles” approach to judicial resolution of religious dis-
putes.
 
234 The neutral principles approach authorizes courts to 
adjudicate religious disputes so long as they rely “exclusively 
on objective, well-established concepts of trust and property 
law familiar to lawyers and judges.”235 The Supreme Court has 
been explicit about the link between the neutral principles ap-
proach to religious disputes and the underlying theory of judi-
cial incompetence to adjudicate religious questions; it is be-
cause “[t]he method relies exclusively on objective, well-
established concepts of trust and property law familiar to law-
yers and judges” that it “thereby promises to free civil courts 
completely from entanglement in questions of religious doc-
trine, polity, and practice.”236
Not surprisingly, the neutral principles doctrine has been 
criticized by advocates of church autonomy as enabling courts 
to intercede in religious disputes so long as they can deftly 




 231. Not surprisingly, Laycock––who refuses to justify church autonomy on 
purely jurisdictional grounds––makes a similar point, arguing that “[a]n or-
ganization has no claim to autonomy when it deals with outsiders who have 
not agreed to be governed by its authority.” Laycock, Towards a General Theo-
ry, supra note 
 On such ac-
68, at 1406. 
 232. See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text. 
 233. See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text. 
 234. See Helfand, supra note 55, at 538.  
 235. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979). 
 236. Id. 
 237. See, e.g., Adams & Hanlon, supra note 75, at 1294–97; Mansfield, su-
pra note 83, at 863–68. But see Brady, supra note 25, at 1643 (emphasizing 
that “[t]he use of neutral principles of law permits courts to avoid entangle-
ment in ecclesiastical questions while at the same time securing free exercise 
values. Through appropriate use of secular language and property concepts, 
religious organizations can specify the resolution they would prefer in the 
  
2013] CHURCH AUTONOMY AS ARBITRATION 1941 
 
counts, employing the neutral principles approach amounts to 
using technicalities and semantics to trespass on the sovereign 
authority of religious institutions.238
One might assume that a theory of church autonomy 
grounded in the implied consent of a religious institution’s 
membership would align itself with the critics of the neutral 
principles doctrine. If the membership has impliedly consented 
to the authority of the church, then the ability to resolve the 
dispute using neutral principles should not matter. Indeed, we 
might even think that this is precisely where the implied con-
sent approach parts ways with the jurisdictional approach; ju-
dicial avoidance of religious questions is simply not something 
that matters from the perspective of an implied consent ap-
proach. 
  
But such a conclusion would be far too hasty. An implied 
consent approach to church autonomy requires considering 
whether or not church members intend to submit disputes that 
are susceptible to adjudication on neutral principles grounds 
for internal religious institutional resolution. While it might be 
fair at times to think the answer is yes, there may be a variety 
of instances where the fact that a dispute can be resolved via 
neutral principles tells us something more fundamental about 
the dispute. Recall that it is precisely because religious life 
aims to achieve salvation, faith, and prayer that we can assume 
individuals impliedly consent to allow such matters to be gov-
erned by a religious institution. Accordingly, the fact that a 
dispute can be resolved through neutral principles may mean 
that we should not be so quick to conclude that the parties have 
impliedly consented to have the particular matter adjudicated 
by the religious institution.239
To be sure, the Supreme Court’s approval of the neutral 




event of a dispute.”). 
 How-
ever, the degree to which a particular dispute or issue is suf-
fused with religious doctrinal considerations tells us quite a lot 
about whether or not the parties impliedly consented to keep 
the matter within the authority of the church. Conversely, to 
the extent religion can be removed from the equation in resolv-
 238. See Dane, supra note 83, at 969; see also Perry Dane, “Omalous” Au-
tonomy, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1715, 1737. 
 239. For a similar point, see Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Insti-
tutions, supra note 13, at 118. See also Helfand, supra note 55, at 540 n.259 
 240. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. 
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ing the dispute may also undermine claims of implied consent. 
As a result, evaluating whether the substance of the dispute 
cannot be extricated from matters of religious doctrine or prac-
tice serves as an important consideration in determining the 
scope of the church autonomy doctrine. 
B. MARGINAL CIVIL COURT REVIEW 
A renewed focus on consent is only half of the church au-
tonomy as constitutionalized arbitration agenda. Emphasizing 
consent—or, more specifically for current purposes, implied 
consent—shifts the church autonomy inquiry away from the ju-
risdictional approach that ties institutional authority to judicial 
incompetence.241 Instead, the autonomy of religious institutions 
is based upon the implied consent of their members. Members, 
on this account, implicitly grant religious institutions this au-
tonomy so as to enable them to promote the unique substantive 
aims of religious life, such as faith and salvation.242
Accordingly, by joining an institution with uniquely reli-
gious goals—what the Supreme Court in Watson described as 
matters of “ecclesiastical cognizance”
  
243
However, basing institutional authority on the implied 
consent of the membership places important limits on church 
autonomy. If the membership has ceded authority to the reli-
gious institution to make rules and resolve disputes, then such 
authority can only extend to good faith self-governing and ad-
judication. By contrast, church autonomy does not require def-
erence to rule-making or adjudication where the results are a 
function of insider dealing, misappropriation and procedurally 
flawed governance. The reason for this draws directly from the 
implied consent rationale; members impliedly consent to the 
—members implicitly 
accept the rule-making and adjudicative authority of the reli-
gious institutional leadership over inherently religious matters. 
In this way, members of religious institutions sign implied ar-
bitration agreements, authorizing religious institutions to gov-
ern the religious life of their members both by making rules 
and resolving disputes that are linked to the core responsibility 
of the institution: promoting and enhancing the religious life of 
its membership. 
 
 241. See supra Part I. 
 242. See supra notes 150–204 and accompanying text. 
 243. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871). 
  
2013] CHURCH AUTONOMY AS ARBITRATION 1943 
 
exercise of true adjudicative and rule-making authority—it 
would be perverse to infer implied consent to misconduct.244
Indeed, in the years following Watson, both the Supreme 
Court and lower courts extended the underlying logic of implied 
consent, refusing to grant deference to religious institutional 
rule-making and adjudication where the institutional rules and 
decision were the result of misconduct.
 
245 In fact, only a year af-
ter deciding Watson, the Supreme Court noted that the majori-
ty of a congregational church is considered to represent the 
church only “if they adhere to the organization and to the doc-
trines.”246 Lower courts largely followed suit,247
 
 244. See supra note 
 most notably in 
146.  
 245. See infra notes 246–62 and accompanying text. 
 246. Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131, 140 (1872). 
 247. See, e.g., Taylor v. Jackson, 273 F.345, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1921) (requiring 
the church to act in conformity with the requirements of its own regulations 
by giving the appellees notice before dropping them from church membership); 
Sims v. Green, 76 F. Supp. 669, 677 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (ruling that civil courts 
have the duty to determine “the existence of the church law, whether it has 
been fairly interpreted and applied, and whether there are judicatories which 
have functioned in practical compliance with the law and within their jurisdic-
tion,” and finding the defendant’s application of church law to not have been a 
“flagrant violation of the laws of the church”); Barkley v. Hayes, 208 F. 319, 
328 (W.D. Mo. 1913) (“[Civil courts] will not interfere with the affairs of an ec-
clesiastical organization, where the rights of property are involved, unless 
there has been a palpable attempt by the governmental authorities of the 
church to abandon altogether the teachings of the original organization.” (em-
phasis added)); Brundage v. Deardorf, 55 F. 839, 846 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1893) 
(finding the majority of a church’s highest judicatory to have committed “[a]n 
open, flagrant, avowed violation of [church law]” and, therefore, to have ceased 
to be and represent the church); Boyles v. Roberts, 121 S.W. 805, 812 (Mo. 
1909) (“[C]ivil courts will investigate and see that the church judicatory has 
acted, and, if so, whether it has acted within the terms of the constitutional 
grant of power . . . [and i]f beyond the constitutional provisions of the church, 
the acts will be declared void.”); Jennings v. Scarborough 56 N.J.L. 401, 408 
(1894) (finding a bishop’s order to terminate the rector of his church irregular, 
and, thus, set aside the order on grounds that notice to the vestry and the rec-
tor did not conform to the requirements of church law, and that the rector was 
deprived of “a hearing upon proofs presented before the committee”); Cohen v. 
Eisenberg, 19 N.Y.S.2d 678, 681 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (deciding that although a ma-
jority of the orthodox rabbinate of New York declared poultry sold in New 
York was not kosher unless it had seals furnished by the Kashruth Associa-
tion of Greater New York, Inc., the court refused to defer to the judgment of 
the rabbinate on the grounds that the plaintiff’s poultry “would otherwise 
meet every requirement to make it kosher . . . and . . . would be kosher if 
slaughtered and prepared in any place in the world except the City of New 
York”), aff’d, 24 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (App. Div. 1940); Wallace v. Tr. of Gen. Assem-
bly of United Presbyterian Church of N. Am., 50 A. 762, 763 (Pa. 1902) (void-
ing the ruling of the general assembly after finding gross irregularity in the 
religious court’s failure to comply with the procedural requirements of church 
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Brundage v. Deardorf where the court explicitly connected 
Watson to the caveat that religious institutions will not be 
granted deference or autonomy where their decisions are 
fraudulent:  
Certainly, the effect of Watson v. Jones cannot be extended beyond 
the principle that a bona fide decision of the fundamental law of the 
church must be recognized as conclusive by civil courts. Clearly, it 
was not the intention of the court to recognize as legitimate the revo-
lutionary action of a majority of a supreme judicatory, in fraud of the 
rights of a minority seeking to maintain the integrity of the original 
compact.248
The Supreme Court made this caveat explicit in its 1929 deci-
sion Gonzalez v. Roman Archbishop of Manila, holding that 
courts must treat the decisions of “the proper church tribu-
nals . . . as conclusive” only in the absence of “fraud, collusion, 
or arbitrariness.”
 
249 And in subsequent years, the Gonzalez 
Court’s holding was widely adopted by lower state and federal 
courts.250
In this way, the implied consent framework works as a 
form of constitutionalized arbitration. Arbitration, at its core, is 
an alternative method of dispute resolution predicated on the 
consent of the parties
 
251 and is policed by courts to ensure the 
absence of fraud, partiality, and other forms of procedural mis-
conduct.252
 
law and a lack of evidence which would justify the general assembly’s reversal 
of the synod); Landrith v. Hudgins, 120 S.W. 783, 811 (Tenn. 1907) (inquiring 
into both the language of a church constitution and the respective doctrines 
between two church organizations, determining one of the organization’s judi-
catory did not have the authority to unite the two bodies, and that doing so 
substantially departed from those doctrines fundamental to the church’s iden-
tity); see also Judicial Intervention in Church Property Disputes—Some Con-
stitutional Considerations, 74 YALE L.J. 1113, 1122 (1965) (collecting cases 
and noting that “[b]y 1950, the principles of Watson v. Jones, modified to min-
imize arbitrary action by church tribunals, though not of constitutional status, 
were widely followed by state and federal courts”). 
 Thus, courts review arbitration awards not to pass 
judgment on the substance of the arbitrator’s decision, but to 
ensure that none of the statutory grounds for vacatur—grounds 
 248. Brundage, 55 F. at 847–48. 
 249. Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16 
(1929). 
 250. Note, Judicial Intervention, supra note 146, at 1120–22 (collecting 
cases). 
 251. See supra note 143. 
 252. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006); see also Dammann, supra note 49, at 470–75 
(collecting state grounds for vacatur). 
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that focus on process and misconduct253
These two principles—consent and review—serve as the 
pillars of the implied consent model of church autonomy. On 
the front end, members impliedly consent to the authority of 
the religious institution to govern religious life.
—require judicial inval-
idation of the arbitrator’s decision.  
254 And on the 
back end, religious institutional decision making is subjected to 
review on grounds such as fraud, misconduct, or other forms of 
procedural naughtiness.255 Of course, this conceptual frame-
work could not survive under the jurisdictional approach to 
church autonomy. Jurisdictional approaches to the religion 
clauses conceive of religion as beyond the jurisdiction of the ju-
dicial system. Thus, such approaches reject the possibility of 
courts resolving any sort of claim that turns on religious doc-
trine or practice, including the review of the decisions issued by 
religious institutions.256
Indeed, in its shift away from the Watson and Gonzalez 
line of cases, the Court emphasized this type of jurisdictional 
logic, concluding that courts were incompetent when it came to 
addressing religious questions.
  
257 Focusing on judicial inability 
to resolve religious questions—as opposed to implied consent to 
church authority—the Court struggled to reconcile the jurisdic-
tional approach with the Court’s own holding in Gonzalez that 
the decisions of religious institutions would need to survive 
“marginal civil court review”258—that is, judicial review for 
“fraud, collusion or arbitrariness”259—in order to be granted 
deference.260
 
 253. Dammann, supra note 
 Armed with its jurisdictional logic, the Court simp-
49, at 470–75. 
 254. See supra Part II.A. 
 255. See supra notes 241–49 and accompanying text. 
 256. See supra Part I.A. 
 257. See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text. 
 258. Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l 
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 447 (1969). 
 259. Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929). 
 260. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 712 (1976). 
In Milivojevich, the Court also suggested that Gonzalez represented a depar-
ture from Watson by authorizing courts to review the decisions of religious in-
stitutions because Watson did not authorize courts to resolve religious ques-
tions. See id. (“[A]lthough Watson had left civil courts no role to play in 
reviewing ecclesiastical decisions during the course of resolving church proper-
ty disputes, Gonzalez first adverted to the possibility of ‘marginal civil court 
review.’” (quoting Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 447)). Howev-
er, even in Watson, the Court expressed a willingness to allow courts to review 
whether a religious institution has complied with the religious requirements of 
an express trust even though such an inquiry would undoubtedly require re-
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ly discarded Gonzalez, explaining in its 1976 decision Serbian 
Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich that:  
For civil courts to analyze whether the ecclesiastical actions of a 
church judicatory are in that sense ‘arbitrary’ must inherently entail 
inquiry into the procedures that canon or ecclesiastical law supposed-
ly requires the church judicatory to follow, or else in to the substan-
tive criteria by which they are supposedly to decide the ecclesiastical 
question.261
 
solving a religious question. See Watson v. Jones, (13 Wall.) 80 U.S. 679, 724 
(1871) (“And though the task may be a delicate one and a difficult one, it will 
be the duty of the court in such cases, when the doctrine to be taught or the 
form of worship to be used is definitely and clearly laid down, to inquire 
whether the party accused of violating the trust is holding or teaching a differ-
ent doctrine, or using a form of worship which is so far variant as to defeat the 
declared objects of the trust.”). Thus, the Court’s claims in Milivojevich about 
Watson––and, in turn, the novelty of Gonzalez––seem largely inaccurate. See 
also Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over 
Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1852 (1998) (“The Court’s treat-
ment of its first class of cases, express deeds and wills, is curiously dissonant 
with its treatment of the latter two. If courts may not competently resolve 
matters of doctrine and practice, even if these are part of a church constitu-
tion, how are those same courts competently to enforce express trusts? Stand-
ards will not be easier to apply because they appear in an express trust rather 
than church documents. Given what the Court says about implied trust, per-
haps a court should enforce an express religious trust against an otherwise 
legitimate authority only if the breach of the express trust is transparently 
clear, as with the Supreme Court’s example of Unitarians succeeding to funds 
devoted to Trinitarian worship. If this limited degree of protection is appropri-
ate for express trusts, why should courts not also protect against acts of higher 
church authorities that blatantly violate standards found in authoritative 
church documents other than trusts?”); Note, When Will Civil Courts Investi-
gate Ecclesiastical Doctrines and Laws?, 39 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1080 (1926) 
(“[Watson] distinguished between cases where the property involved had been 
settled upon trust expressly for the promulgation of a particular set of doc-
trines, and cases where it had been given to the church without further quali-
fication. There being a trust of the former type and a claim of diversion from 
the fixed purposes, it was recognized that investigation and comparison of re-
ligious doctrines would be unavoidable. This dictum has never been doubted.”). 
 
 261. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713. While the Court did not explicitly over-
rule Gonzalez as it pertained to fraud and collusion, it cast significant doubt 
on their continued constitutional viability. See id. (holding “that whether or 
not there is room for ‘marginal civil court review’ under the narrow rubrics of 
‘fraud’ or ‘collusion’ when church tribunals act in bad faith for secular purpos-
es, no ‘arbitrariness’ exception is consistent with” the religion clauses); see also 
Young v. N. Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184, 187 (7th 
Cir. 1994) (recognizing that the Supreme Court left open the possibility of re-
view for fraud or collusion, but noting the “unlikely significance this ‘open is-
sue’ might have in some hypothetical case”); Church of Scientology Flag Serv. 
Org., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514, 1541 (11th Cir. 1993) (casting 
doubt on the constitutional viability of judicial review of religious decisions for 
fraud or collusion).  
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And, such an inquiry was impermissible under a jurisdictional 
approach to the religion clauses:  
But this is exactly the inquiry that the First Amendment prohibits; 
recognition of such an exception would undermine the general rule 
that religious controversies are not the proper subject of civil court 
inquiry, and that a civil court must accept the ecclesiastical decisions 
of church tribunals as it finds them.262
However, and notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s more re-
cent church property cases,
 
263 we need not relegate courts to the 
sidelines in any and all religious disputes. To the contrary, the 
Court’s early church property cases carved out a significant—
although not expansive—role for courts in the adjudication of 
religious disputes. While prohibited from interfering in the 
substance of the religious disputes, Watson and Gonzalez264—
not to mention Bouldin265 and a bevy of lower court cases266—
envisioned courts providing a counter-balance to church auton-
omy by reviewing the decisions of religious institutions for mis-
conduct and fraud.267 Like in the context of arbitration, it would 
simply be too perilous to grant deference to religious institu-
tions without some judicial safeguard.268 Moreover, the underly-
ing logic of church autonomy—the implied consent of the 
church membership—could only be extended to instances 
where the parties received the type of adjudication they con-
sented to—that is, adjudication free of fraud, collusion or mis-
conduct.269
To be sure, the Court raises important worries in 
Milivojevich. It is one thing for a court to investigate whether 
fraud or collusion stands behind the decision of a religious in-
 
 
 262. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713.  
 263. See Greenawalt, supra note 260, at 1853–59 (discussing evolution of 
the modern view regarding the “fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness” exception). 
 264. Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 16 (articulating the “fraud, collusion, or arbi-
trariness” exception); see also supra note 260 (discussing the analytical link 
between Watson and the “fraud, collusion or arbitrariness” exception).  
 265. Bouldin v. Alexander, (15 Wall) 82 U.S. 131, 140 (1872).  
 266. See supra note 247. 
 267. See supra note 247. 
 268. See Ellman, supra note 140, at 1391. 
 269. See supra note 146. To be sure, one could envision a religious group 
that makes decisions that are expressly haphazard and lacking in procedural 
safeguards. If the contours of such a process were open and obvious, then an 
implied consent model would grant a broader scope of autonomy to the rele-
vant religious institutions. That being said, it seems reasonable to adopt a de-
fault rule whereby individuals are presumed to expect—and thereby impliedly 
consent—to authority exercised in the absence of fraud or collusion.  
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stitution;270 while such an inquiry enables a court to oversee the 
internal adjudication within a religious institution, the evalua-
tion is limited to questions of deceit and sham dispute resolu-
tion. By contrast, the prospect of authorizing a court to evalu-
ate the decision of religious institutions for “arbitrariness” is 
far more fraught. In 1969, prior to the wholesale shift of Su-
preme Court doctrine from the implied consent model to the ju-
risdictional model, Paul Kauper worried that “‘Arbitrariness’ as 
a standard for review is an indeterminate and flexible term. 
Much can be poured into it.”271
Here again, however, relying on arbitration as a frame-
work for church autonomy provides important guidance. Like 
the “arbitrariness” review proposed in Gonzalez, arbitration 
doctrine in some jurisdictions provides courts with the ability to 
vacate arbitration awards on the grounds of “irrationality.”
 Indeed, one can imagine that 
unlike fraud or collusion, review for arbitrariness might au-
thorize courts to reject the decisions of religious institutions on 
substantive grounds. Such judicial authority would enable 
courts to trespass upon the core authority of religious institu-
tions to, in good faith, make rules and resolve disputes that 
touch upon the religious life of a particular faith community.  
272
 
 270. Indeed, despite the fact that the Court implicitly criticized judicial in-
quiry into religious decision for fraud or collusion, some courts continue to en-
force these remaining prongs of the Gonzalez inquiry. See, e.g., Askew v. Trs. 
of the Gen. Assembly of the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic 
Faith, Inc., 684 F.3d 413, 418 (3d Cir. 2012) (“In so doing, civil courts accept 
decisions of the highest religious decision-maker as binding fact, so long as 
those decisions are not tainted by fraud or collusion.”); Kaufmann v. Sheehan, 
707 F.2d 355, 358 (8th Cir. 1983) (asserting that the fraud or collusion excep-
tions are not foreclosed by Milivojevich).  
 
 271. Paul G. Kauper, Church Autonomy and the First Amendment: The 
Presbyterian Church Case, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 347, 374. Indeed, Kauper fur-
ther concluded “it may safely be predicted that future litigation will furnish a 
rich glossary on “fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness.” Id. Of course, this predic-
tion ultimately never came to pass because of the Court’s shift to a jurisdic-
tional interpretation of the religion clauses. 
 272. See generally Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law Is No Ex-
cuse: Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 102–08 
(1997) (discussing court applications of the irrationality standard); Stephen L. 
Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Ar-
bitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731, 789–93 (1996) (discussing evolution of 
the irrationality ground for vacatur); Murray S. Levin, The Role of Substantive 
Law in Business Arbitration and the Importance of Volition, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 
105, 150–55 (1997) (providing examples of judicial discussion of the irrational-
ity ground for vacatur). The continued viability of the “wholly irrational” 
ground for vacatur was brought into doubt by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, 552 U.S. 576, 586–89 (2008), which held that 9 
U.S.C. § 10 (2006) provides an exclusive list of grounds for vacating arbitra-
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While the doctrine is not without significant criticism,273 courts 
have largely limited its application to instances where an arbi-
trator’s award lacks any factual basis in the record.274 In so do-
ing, they have continued to uphold broad deference to an arbi-
trator’s substantive decisions, using irrationality to capture 
cases where the award bears no resemblance to the underlying 
facts.275 In this way, irrationality has served as a quasi-
procedural ground for vacating awards,276 only being deployed 
where there is no possible substantive justification for an arbi-
tral decision.277
 
tion awards. Compare Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy and Vacatur 
After Hall Street, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1103, 1141 (2009) (arguing that the 
irrationality ground for vacatur is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s hold-
ing in Hall Street), with Michael H. LeRoy, Are Arbitrators Above the Law? 
The “Manifest Disregard of the Law” Standard, 52 B.C. L. REV. 137, 172–73 
(2011) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s holding was not clear as it applied to 
various non-statutory grounds for vacatur, including irrationality); see also 
Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1288 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(“We have not elaborated on what ‘completely irrational’ means, but the 
Eighth Circuit has persuasively indicated that the ‘completely irrational’ 
standard is extremely narrow and is satisfied only ‘where [the arbitration de-
cision" fails to draw its essence from the agreement.’” (quoting Hoffman v. 
Cargill Inc., 236 F.3d 458, 461–62 (8th Cir. 2001))). 
  
 273. See, e.g., Hayford, supra note 272, at 793 (criticizing the “irrationality” 
ground for vacatur because it “opens the door to substantial judicial evaluation 
of the merits of commercial arbitration awards by a court that is predisposed 
to engage in that type of exercise when confronted with an award it believes to 
be grossly inaccurate or incorrect”). 
 274. New York case law contains the most significant discussion of irra-
tionality as a ground for vacating awards. See Levin, supra note 272, at 151. 
Courts are clear that it will not apply if there is any basis in the record for the 
arbitrator’s award. See, e.g., Branciforte v. Levey, 635 N.Y.S.2d 22 (App. Div. 
1995) (refusing to vacate award because “[t]here was some basis in the record 
for each of the arbitrator’s findings”).  
 275. See, e.g., Campbell v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 821 N.Y.S.2d 27, 27–28 
(App. Div. 2006) (noting that while an arbitrator’s award may be vacated if it 
is “totally irrational” an arbitrator’s award cannot be vacated for errors of fact 
and law and, in turn, “an arbitration award cannot be vacated if there exists 
any plausible basis for it”); see also Graniteville Co. v. First Nat’l Trading Co., 
578 N.Y.S.2d 183, 185 (App. Div. 1992) (“An arbitration award will be con-
firmed if any plausible basis exists for the award and mere errors of law or 
fact will not suffice as a basis for vacatur.”). 
 276. Levin, supra note 272, at 152 (“Many of the irrationality cases relate 
more to the fact-finding process than the use or misuse of principles of sub-
stantive law.”). 
 277. See, e.g., Loiacono v. Nassau Cmty. Coll., 692 N.Y.S.2d 113, 114 (App. 
Div. 1999) (vacating award where an arbitrator has made findings contrary to 
facts agreed upon by all parties); Spear, Leeds & Kellogg v. Bullseye Secs., 
Inc., 738 N.Y.S.2d 27, 28 (App. Div. 2002) (vacating award where an arbitrator 
has granted an award on dismissed claims); Levin supra note 272, at 150–51 
(“[W]hile many cases refer to and seemingly recognize irrationality as a 
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Such a limited use of irrationality fits with the consent-
based authority granted arbitrators. A court should only inter-
vene on irrationality grounds where an arbitrator’s award is so 
far afield that the award can no longer be justified by the con-
sent of the parties; an award that is so exceptionally discon-
nected from the arbitral record cannot have been authorized by 
the parties.278
Using arbitral irrationality as a blueprint, courts can simi-
larly deploy arbitrariness in the church autonomy context. Like 
arbitration, our own model of church autonomy is grounded in 
consent.
 
279 Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s early church prop-
erty cases envisioned lower courts providing a marginal review 
of religious institutional decisions before granting them defer-
ence.280 This limited review was meant to reinforce the underly-
ing rationale of church autonomy; members of religious institu-
tions impliedly consent to the institution’s authority to make 
rules and resolve disputes that touch upon the substance of re-
ligious life.281 However, adjudication that is fraudulent or collu-
sive—and even adjudication that is so pervasively arbitrary 
that it finds no justification in the record—cannot be justified 
by implied consent.282
Along these lines, the arbitrariness exception to religious 
institutional deference would function like the irrationality ex-
ception to arbitral deference. It would apply in an extremely 
limited set of circumstances where the religious institution’s 
decision lacked absolutely any basis in the relevant facts or 
doctrine such that it gave strong indication that it was the re-
sult of some sort of procedural impropriety. As in the case of 
arbitration, religious institutions ought to be granted broad 
deference as it pertains to their substantive adjudication and 
rule-making; by contrast, courts can play a role by policing reli-
gious institutional decisions for gross procedural improprieties 
or where a decision is so disconnected from the facts and cir-
cumstances that it appears to rest on fraud or collusion. Church 
  
 
ground for vacation, one has to search long and hard to find a vacation that is 
actually based on a determination of irrationality.”). 
 278. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 272, at 107 (“Focusing on the magnitude 
(and to a lesser extent on the quality) of the error satisfies the intent of the 
arbitrating parties who would not condone irrational applications of the very 
law they instructed the arbitrators to follow.”). 
 279. See supra Part II.A. 
 280. See supra notes 244–70 and accompanying text. 
 281. See supra notes 251–55 and accompanying text.  
 282. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.  
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members impliedly consent to good faith adjudication, not to 
decision making that amounts to misconduct.  
III.  RESOLVING HOSANNA-TABOR’S UNANSWERED 
QUESTIONS   
Thus far, this Article has advanced two general claims. The 
first of these claims is that recent doctrinal developments have 
provided strong indications that the religion clauses, and in 
particular the Establishment Clause, should be understood as 
jurisdictional;283 that is, that the religion clauses supported a 
strong separation between church and state whereby both reli-
gion and government were conceptualized as separate sover-
eigns each without the authority to trespass on the jurisdiction 
of the other.284
The second claim is that footnote four of Hosanna-Tabor 
has undermined this jurisdictional view of the religion clauses 
by conceptualizing the ministerial exception as an affirmative 
defense.
  
285 If the ministerial exception, grounded more general-
ly in broader notions of church autonomy, is an affirmative de-
fense, then it opens the possibility for religious institutions to 
waive such defenses.286 And if such defenses are waived, then 
courts may find themselves authorized to adjudicate cases that 
rest on disputes over religious doctrine and practice.287
This realization that Hosanna-Tabor cannot rest on a ju-
risdictional view of the religion clauses requires a wholesale 
reevaluation of the theory behind church-state relations and in 
particular a reconsideration of why it is that religious institu-
tions are provided some scope of autonomy in core religious 
matters. To fill the void created by footnote four, this Article 
proposed returning to the doctrinal roots of church autonomy, 
which conceptualized church autonomy as a form of constitu-
tionalized arbitration; that is, religious institutions derived 
their authority over rule-making and adjudication from the im-




 283. See supra notes 
 And the rules made and deci-
sions rendered by religious institutions were still subject to civ-
65–68 and accompanying text. 
 284. See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 
13–15 and accompanying text. 
 285. See supra notes 140–49 and accompanying text. 
 286. See supra notes 130–36 and accompanying text. 
 287. See supra notes 130–36 and accompanying text.  
 288. See supra notes 150–204 and accompanying text. 
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il court review for procedural misconduct.289 This would ensure 
that religious institutions were granted authority and autono-
my only to the extent that their rules and decisions did not de-
rive from foul play; indeed, tainted rules and decisions lack le-
gitimacy precisely because members could not be understood to 
have impliedly consented to sham religious proceedings.290
Recognizing the import of footnote four—both that it is in-
consistent with the jurisdictional view of the religion clauses 
and that it is consistent with earlier arbitration-based versions 
of church autonomy—is vital if we are to resolve key questions 
that remain in the wake of Hosanna-Tabor. While the Supreme 
Court successfully entrenched the ministerial exception by 
handing down a unanimous decision, it did so at the cost of ad-
dressing two crucial and recurring issues that consistently 
arise in church-state litigation: (1) how are courts to define who 
is a minister for the purposes of the ministerial exception,
 
291 
and (2) can courts address claims that the decisions of religious 
institutions of are in reality pretextual.292
To address these thorny questions—questions that arose in 




A. WHO IS A MINISTER? 
—requires extending the logic of footnote four 
by unpacking the implications of an arbitration-based model of 
church autonomy and how the model deploys its key concepts of 
implied consent and marginal civil court review.  
One of the primary issues left relatively unaddressed in 
the Supreme Court’s Hosanna-Tabor decision is the persistent 
question of who constitutes a “minister” for the purposes of the 
ministerial exception.294 This question has bedeviled lower 
courts,295
 
 289. See supra Part II.B. 
 injecting significant uncertainty into the employment 
 290. See supra note 146. 
 291. See infra Part III.A. 
 292. See infra Part III.B. 
 293. See infra notes 317, 319–23 and accompanying text. 
 294. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. 
Ct. 694, 707 (2012) (“We are reluctant, however, to adopt a rigid formula for 
deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister. It is enough for us to con-
clude, in this our first case involving the ministerial exception, that the excep-
tion covers Perich, given all the circumstances of her employment.”). 
 295. See, e.g., Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 208 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Cir-
cuit courts applying the ministerial exception have consistently struggled to 
decide whether or not a particular employee is functionally a ‘minister.’”). 
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relationships between religious institutions and their employ-
ees.296 Indeed, some courts have even wondered whether an-
swering the “who is a minister” question itself impermissibly 
entangles courts in religious questions.297
Faced with this inquiry, many courts have adopted a “func-
tional approach,” considering whether the primary duties of the 
employee indicate that the ministerial exception should ap-
ply.
 
298 Accordingly, courts do not exclusively look to whether the 
employee is a minister,299 but whether the “employee’s primary 
duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church govern-
ance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or partici-
pation in religious ritual and worship.”300
One of the consequences of this functional approach to an-
swering the “who is a minister” question is the focus of judicial 
inquiry on the relative importance or centrality of an employee 




 296. Note, The Ministerial Exception to Title VII: The Case for a Deferential 
Primary Duties Test, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1776, 1788 (2008) (“The difficulty 
courts have in distinguishing religious from nonreligious job functions produc-
es the second problem with the primary duties inquiry: the test creates incon-
sistent results that leave religious organizations uncertain whether a court 
will classify an employee as a minister.”). 
 The logic here is 
 297. Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 397 F.3d 790, 797 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(Kozinski, J., concurring in the order denying rehearing en banc) (“Religions 
vary drastically in their hierarchical and organizational structure, and it is 
often a tricky business to distinguish spiritual from administrative officials 
and clergy from congregation. The very invocation of the ministerial exception 
requires us to engage in entanglement with a vengeance.”); see also William S. 
Stickman, IV, Comment, An Exercise in Futility: Does the Inquiry Required to 
Apply the Ministerial Exception to Title VII Defeat Its Purpose?, 43 DUQ. L. 
REV. 285, 298 (2005) (arguing that application of the ministerial exception 
leads to impermissible entanglement). 
 298. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 304 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006) (col-
lecting cases); Elvig, 375 F.3d at 958 n.3 (same). 
 299. See, e.g., Rweyemamu, 520 F.3d at 208; Elvig, 375 F.3d at 958 (“Other 
federal circuit courts have adopted similar approaches, looking to the function 
of the position rather than to ordination in deciding whether the ministerial 
exception applies to a particular employee’s Title VII claim.”); Young v. N. Ill. 
Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184, 186 (7th Cir. 1994); 
Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168 
(4th Cir. 1985) (holding that the ministerial exception “does not depend upon 
ordination but upon the function of the position”).  
 300. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169 (citing Bagni, supra note 212, at 1545); see 
also Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 226 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(same). 
 301. See Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238, 
1243 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rayburn); Werft v. Desert Sw. Annual Confer-
ence of United Methodist Church, 377 F.3d 1099, 1101 n.4 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(same); Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169 (“This [functional] approach necessarily 
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sound. To the extent courts conceptualize the ministerial excep-
tion as aimed at providing religious institutions with space to 
pursue their own religious missions, then the protections af-
forded by the ministerial exception are dependent on the cen-
tral role played by employees in the pursuit of those missions.302 
Accordingly, a number of courts have held that a church’s mu-
sic director is subject to the ministerial exception because of the 
central role played by music in religious liturgy and services.303 
Similarly, one court applied the ministerial exception to a 
communications director because “[t]he role of the press secre-
tary is critical in message dissemination, and a church’s mes-
sage, of course, is of singular importance.”304 In this way, the 
functional approach extrapolates from the central role of the 
minister in the religious life of the religious community305—the 
recognition that “the relationship between an organized church 
and its ministers is its lifeblood”306
While there is nothing inconsistent about this approach, it 
requires courts to focus on the central or important components 
of a religious community’s mission in order to apply the minis-
terial exception
—and seeks to extend the 
minister paradigm to other employees.  
307
 
requires a court to determine whether a position is important to the spiritual 
and pastoral mission of the church.”). 
—a trend that is likely to continue post-
 302. See infra notes 303–04; see also Ross v. Metro. Church of God, 471 F. 
Supp. 2d 1306, 1311 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (“[T]here can be little doubt that Plain-
tiff’s position as the director of the Worship Arts Department of the Metropoli-
tan Church falls within the ambit of the ministerial exception. It is clear from 
Plaintiff’s Complaint that his position as Pastor of Worship Services is im-
portant to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the church.” (internal quota-
tion marks and citation omitted)).  
 303. See Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1040–41 (7th 
Cir. 2006) (emphasizing the vital discretionary role played by the plaintiff, a 
music director, in the religious life of the church), abrogated by Hosanna-
Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 694; EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 
F.3d 795, 802–03 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[M]usic is a vital means of expressing and 
celebrating those beliefs which a religious community holds most sacred. Mu-
sic is an integral part of many different religious traditions.”); Starkman v. 
Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 177 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that the plaintiff conceded 
that “for her and her congregation, music constitutes a form of prayer that is 
an integral part of worship services and Scripture readings”). 
 304. Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698, 704 (7th 
Cir. 2003). 
 305. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 559 (5th Cir. 1972) (“The 
minister is the chief instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill its pur-
pose. Matters touching this relationship must necessarily be recognized as of 
prime ecclesiastical concern.”). 
 306. Id. at 558. 
 307. See, e.g., EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 464 (D.C. Cir. 
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Hosanna-Tabor.308 On the margins, courts may refuse to apply 
the ministerial exception where the employee appears to play a 
minor or marginal role in the community’s religious life. This 
has particularly been the case with reference to teachers in pa-
rochial schools who do not, at least at first glance, play a signif-
icant role in religious instruction.309 Indeed, some courts have 
refused to apply the ministerial exception where a teacher’s re-
sponsibilities overwhelmingly entail secular instruction and ex-
tremely limited religious teaching.310
But such a framework appears to miss a far more funda-
mental point. The fact that teachers of secular subjects are also 
given responsibility over religious instruction highlights that 
many parochial schools resist the imposed distinction between 
secular and religious instruction. To the contrary, some paro-
 
 
1996) (applying the ministerial exception to a member of the Canon Law Fac-
ulty because they “perform the vital function of instructing those who will in 
turn interpret, implement, and teach the law governing the Roman Catholic 
Church and the administration of its sacraments. Although [the plaintiff was] 
not a priest, she [was] a member of a religious order who sought a tenured pro-
fessorship in a field that is of fundamental importance to the spiritual mission 
of her Church.”); EEOC v. Sw. Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 
285 (5th Cir. 1981); Lukaszewski v. Nazareth Hosp., 764 F. Supp. 57, 60 (E.D. 
Pa. 1991) (“Religious doctrine is a much less important factor in most hospital 
personnel decisions than it is in religious school decisions to hire and fire 
teachers.”). 
 308. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 708 (“In light of these considera-
tions—the formal title given Perich by the Church, the substance reflected in 
that title, her own use of that title, and the important religious functions she 
performed for the Church—we conclude that Perich was a minister covered by 
the ministerial exception.” (emphasis added)); id. at 715 (Alito, J., concurring) 
(“What matters is that respondent played an important role as an instrument 
of her church’s religious message and as a leader of its worship activities.”). 
 309. See, e.g., Gallo v. Salesian Soc’y, 676 A.2d 580, 590–92 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1996) (collecting and discussing various cases); see also EEOC v. 
Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 1369–70 (9th Cir. 1986); EEOC v. Pac. 
Press Publ’g Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1278 (9th Cir. 1982), abrogation recognized 
by Alcazar v. Corp. of Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 598 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 
2010), vacated in part, adopted in part, 627 F.3d 1288 (9th Cir. 2010); EEOC v. 
Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 310. See, e.g., Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 440 F. 
Supp. 2d 211, 221 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (concluding that “the ministerial exception 
does not apply in the case at bar, as plaintiff’s teaching duties were primarily 
secular; those religious in nature were limited to only one hour of Bible in-
struction per day and attending religious ceremonies with students only once 
per year”); Guinan v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis, 42 F. Supp. 
2d 849, 852 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (refusing to apply the ministerial exception where 
the plaintiff “was not an ordained minister, the vast majority of the classes she 
taught regarded secular subjects, and she did not lead in religious worship 
services. Conversely, however, she was a Catechist, taught at least one class in 
religion per term, and organized Mass once a month.”). 
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chial schools specifically seek to provide an integrated religious 
experience for their students and thereby seek out teachers 
that can provide instruction in secular subjects while simulta-
neously reinforcing the religious ideals of the institution.311
By contrast to the functional approach, an implied consent 
model of church autonomy places far less weight on the central-
ity or importance of an employee’s role in determining whether 
to apply the ministerial exception. Indeed, on the implied con-
sent model, the entire focus on the “minister,” even merely as a 
paradigm case, is misguided. Instead, courts should focus more 
directly on whether, in light of the nature of the institution,
 
312 
the relationship between the parties,313 and the substance of 
the dispute,314
In this way, applying the ministerial exception is less 
about the centrality of the employee in the religious life of the 
religious institution and far more about determining whether 
there was, so to speak, an implied arbitration agreement be-
tween the parties.
 the employee should have understood that ac-
cepting employment with the religious institution also entailed 
submitting to the authority of the religious institution’s rule-
making and adjudicative authority. 
315 To be sure, whether or not the employee 
actually is a minister will play an important role in that in-
quiry. Moreover, if the employee does play a central role in the 
religious life of the community, then it is more likely a court 
should conclude that the ministerial exception applies. But, in 
the words of the Second Circuit, the prevailing functional ap-
proach is far “too rigid.”316
 
 311. See, e.g., Gallo, 676 A.2d at 590–92 (collecting cases where defendants 
made such claims); see also EEOC v. Tree of Life Christian Sch., 751 F. Supp. 
700, 706–07 (S.D. Ohio 1990). 
 Indeed, an employee can play a po-
 312. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 313. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 314. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 315. This type of analysis was contemplated by the Minnesota Supreme 
Court in Trustees of East Norway Lake Norwegian Evangelical Lutheran 
Church v. Halvorson, 44 N.W. 663 (Minn. 1890), albeit it not on constitutional 
grounds. See id. at 665 (holding that the decisions of religious institutions are 
“conclusive” “not because the law recognizes any authority in such bodies to 
make any decision touching civil rights, but because the parties, by their con-
tract, have made the right of property to depend on adherence to, or teaching 
of, the particular doctrines as they may be defined by such judicatory. In other 
words, they have made it the arbiter upon any questions that may arise as to 
what the doctrines are, and as to what is according to them.”); see also Ber-
nard, supra note 140, at 558 (discussing Halvorson and using it as a founda-
tion for a common law conception of religious institutional authority).  
 316. Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 208 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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tentially minor role in the religious life of the institution, but 
the surrounding factors—a pervasively religious institutional 
culture or job qualifications that indicate the importance of re-
ligious fit even for marginal employees—might give us good 
reason to conclude that the employee impliedly consented to 
the adjudicative authority of the religious institution when ac-
cepting employment. Thus, on an implied consent model, courts 
would look for indicators of implied consent, not hallmarks of 
religious importance. While these inquiries may overlap, they 
can frequently diverge in important ways, especially when it 
comes to teachers providing secular instruction in parochial 
schools.317
B. PRETEXT AND “MARGINAL REVIEW” 
  
Uncertainty regarding the scope of the ministerial excep-
tion—that is, who is a minister—was not the only problem left 
unresolved by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Hosanna-
Tabor.318 During the Hosanna-Tabor oral argument, the Justic-
es repeatedly asked counsel for both parties whether courts can 
review the decisions of religious institutions to determine if 
they were pretextual.319
 
 317. Cf. EEOC v. Tree of Life Christian Sch., 751 F. Supp. 700, 706 (S.D. 
Ohio 1990) (“Although it appears undisputed that the principles of the Chris-
tian faith pervade the schools’ educational activities, this alone would not 
make a teacher or administrator a ‘minister’ for purposes of exempting that 
person from the FLSA’s definition of ‘employee.’”); Gallo v. Salesian Soc’y, 676 
A.2d 580, 590 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (“Defendants now rely on this 
stipulation [that ‘religion permeates the school atmosphere’], plus ‘The philos-
ophy of Don Bosco Preparatory High School’ and the guide to hiring teachers, 
‘Characteristics of Teachers in Catholic Schools,’ to support their contention 
that all parochial school teachers, regardless of the subject taught, perform a 
ministerial function. However, none of these generalized contentions support 
the conclusion that propagation of the faith was an integral part of the curric-
ulum in secular subjects taught by plaintiff.”). 
 The worry here was two-fold. First, a 
 318. See supra Part III.A. 
 319. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Hosanna-Tabor Evangeli-
cal Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (No. 10-553), 
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_ 
transcripts/10-553.pdf (Sotomayor, J., questioning petitioner) (asking petition-
er how it proposes dealing with pretext in the context of reporting sexual 
abuse); id. at 12–13 (Scalia, J., questioning petitioner) (“So you would al-
low . . . the government courts to probe behind the church’s assertion that this 
[math teacher] is a minister?”); id. at 22 (Alito, J., questioning petitioner) 
(worrying that pretext analysis necessarily requires judicial inquiry into the 
centrality of religious teachings); id. at 39 (Scalia, J., questioning respondent) 
(“Would you . . . allow the government to go . . . into the . . . dismissal of the 
Catholic priest to see whether indeed it . . . was pretextual?”); id. at 43–44 
(Alito, J., questioning respondent) (worrying that the pretext inquiry will, in 
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religious institution might, in bad faith, claim that a plaintiff is 
a minister solely in order to be shielded from liability;320 second, 
a religious institution might claim that a plaintiff had been 
terminated for religious reasons when in fact the termination 
was motivated by various forms of impermissible discrimina-
tion.321 In each instance, the Justices wondered how a court 
could simultaneously grant deference to the internal decision-
making of religious institutions while still retaining the author-
ity to check such decisions for pretext or bad faith.322
Despite the significant focus on the issue at oral argument, 
the Court’s decision did little to address the question.
 
323 The 
primary discussion of pretext came in Justice Alito’s concur-
rence in which he argues that a pretext inquiry would “danger-
ously undermine the religious autonomy” because “[i]n order to 
probe the real reason for respondent’s firing, a civil court—and 
perhaps a jury—would be required to make a judgment about 
church doctrine.”324 Rendering such a judgment “would require 
calling witnesses to testify about the importance and priority of 
the religious doctrine in question, with a civil factfinder sitting 
in ultimate judgment of what the accused church really be-
lieves, and how important that belief is to the church’s overall 
mission.”325
 
some cases, require courts to evaluate religious scholarship); id. at 56 
(Sotomayor, J., questioning petitioner) (“So you would say with janitors, you 
can get into the pretext question[?]”). 
 
 320. See, e.g., id. at 12–13 (Scalia, J., questioning petitioner) (asking 
whether the courts could try whether the church’s labeling its employee a min-
ister is a scam); id. at 55 (Sotomayor, J., questioning petitioner) (asking 
whether under petitioner’s test the status of the individual matters).  
 321. See, e.g., id. at 5 (Sotomayor, J., questioning petitioner) (asking how to 
deal with cases where the religious institution fires a teacher for reporting 
sexual abuse); id. at 38–39 (Scalia, J., questioning respondent) (asking wheth-
er a court may review a pretext claim where a priest claims he was fired for 
threatening to sue the church, but the church argues they fired him because 
he was married); id. at 43–44 (Alito, J., questioning respondent) (asking 
whether the court may try the pretext issue where a female nun claims she 
was not given tenured position at a Catholic University because of her sex, but 
the organization claims it was based on an honest evaluation of her canon 
scholarship). 
 322. See, e.g., id. at 5 (Sotomayor, J., questioning petitioner); id. at 12–13 
(Scalia, J., questioning petitioner); id. at 43–44 (Alito, J., questioning respond-
ent). 
 323. The only mention of pretext came towards the end of the Court’s deci-
sion in a short paragraph raising the question. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 
at 709. For further discussion, see infra notes 333–36 and accompanying text. 
 324. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 715 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 325. Id. 
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Of course, this type of inquiry poses a problem only to the 
extent we embrace the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional turn, 
which grounds church autonomy in the incompetence of courts 
to resolve religious questions.326 This is the interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause prominent in Serbian Eastern Orthodox 
v. Milivojevich and Jones v. Wolf.327
But, as described above, such a jurisdictional turn stands 
at odds with the implied consent model of church autonomy ar-
ticulated by the Court in its early church property cases.
 
328 In-
deed, the implied consent model embraces judicial review of re-
ligious institutional decisions because it ensures that the 
parties receive the good faith adjudication they implicitly con-
sented to when becoming members of the particular religious 
institution. Thus, the Supreme Court329 and a variety of lower 
courts330 envisioned a “marginal civil court review” of religious 
institutions whereby the decisions of religious institutions 
would be granted deference once a court determined that the 
decision was not tainted by “fraud, collusion, or arbitrari-
ness.”331 In contrast to jurisdictional approaches that tied 
church autonomy to judicial incompetence, an implied consent 
model demands judicial inquiry into religious questions in or-
der to ensure that religious institutions are making rules and 
resolving disputes in good faith.332
Interestingly, the only discussion of pretext in the majority 
opinion comes in one short paragraph: 
 
The EEOC and Perich suggest that Hosanna-Tabor’s asserted reli-
gious reason for firing Perich—that she violated the Synod’s commit-
ment to internal dispute resolution—was pretextual. That suggestion 
misses the point of the ministerial exception. The purpose of the ex-
ception is not to safeguard a church’s decision to fire a minister only 
when it is made for a religious reason. The exception instead ensures 
that the authority to select and control who will minister to the faith-
ful—a matter “strictly ecclesiastical” . . . is the church’s alone.333
In addressing claims of pretext, the majority opinion avoids 
grounding church autonomy in judicial incompetence. Instead, 
 
 
 326. See supra notes 69–94 and accompanying text. 
 327. See supra notes 69–94 and accompanying text. 
 328. See supra notes 69–94 and accompanying text. 
 329. See supra notes 243–70 and accompanying text. 
 330. See supra note 247 (collecting examples). 
 331. Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16 
(1929). 
 332. See supra Part II.A. 
 333. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. 
Ct. 694, 709 (2012) (citation omitted). 
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the Court focuses on the overall nature of the dispute—that is, 
the nature of the parties and the relationship between the par-
ties—in concluding that such a matter was undoubtedly within 
the core authority of the religious institution. Indeed, it is at 
the end of this paragraph that the Court drops footnote four, 
the ultimate renunciation of the jurisdictional interpretation of 
church autonomy. In this way, the Court begins the process of 
distancing the doctrine from the prevailing jurisdictional ap-
proach to the religious clauses; it both avoids arguing from ju-
dicial incompetence and simultaneously conceives of the minis-
terial exception as an affirmative defense, thereby opening the 
door for judicial adjudication of such disputes in cases of waiv-
er.334
On the heels of Hosanna-Tabor, lowers courts appear will-
ing to pursue this new logic, interpreting the ministerial excep-
tion as an affirmative defense.
  
335 In turn, court opinions are 
opening the door for an increased judicial role in the resolution 
of religious disputes.336
  CONCLUSION   
 Of course, such an increased role would 
never have been possible within a jurisdictional framework be-
cause religious and judicial institutions inhabit different 
spheres and are not permitted to trespass on the adjudicative 
territory of the other; the wall of separation simply did not al-
low for it. But that was before footnote four.  
As many have noted, the Supreme Court’s decision in Ho-
sanna-Tabor represented a strong endorsement of autonomy 
for religious institutions over core religious matters.337
 
 334. See supra notes 
 But Ho-
sanna-Tabor represents a reformulation of the relationship be-
tween church and state, discarding a jurisdictional approach 
that had become increasingly popular among courts and schol-
130–36 and accompanying text. 
 335. See Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1318 
(11th Cir. 2012); Petschonek v. Catholic Diocese of Memphis, No. W2011-
02216-COA-R9-CV, slip op. at 6 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2012). 
 336. Hamilton, 680 F.3d at 1318.  
 337. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Supreme Court: Discrimination Laws Do Not 
Protect Certain Employees of Religious Groups, WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-discrimination-laws-do 
-not-protect-certain-employees-of-religiousgroups/2012/01/11/gIQAIbO4qP_ 
story.html; Jess Bravin, Justices: Ex-Worker Can’t Sue Church, WALL ST. J., 
Jan 12, 2012, at A7; Adam Liptak, Religious Groups Given ‘Exception’ to Work 
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ars.338
This dynamic approach, however, needs its own doctrinal 
and philosophical foundations. Such a foundation is readily 
available in the Court’s early and long-marginalized church 
property cases. Those cases built notions of church autonomy 
on the implied consent of a religious institution’s membership. 
At the same time, these early church property cases recognized 
that if the authority of religious institutions is tied to the con-
sent of the membership, then such authority can only extend to 
good faith rule-making and adjudication. Where religious insti-
tutions engage in misconduct, there can be no claim to implied 
consent and, in turn, no claim to autonomy from judicial inter-
vention. Grounded in principles of implied consent and margin-
al review, this framework for church autonomy mirrored arbi-
tration and tied church autonomy not to the adjudicative 
disability of courts, but to the membership’s implicit decision to 
have the religious life of their community guided by religious 
authorities.  
 In its place stands footnote four, which embraces the 
ministerial exception as an affirmative defense. Accordingly, 
the ministerial exception can be waived and parties can author-
ize courts to adjudicate what are, in essence, religious disputes. 
In so doing, the Supreme Court has presented a far more dy-
namic view of the relationship between church and state, con-
structing a wall of separation that is far more permeable than 
the jurisdictional approach to the religion clauses ever allowed. 
Understanding church autonomy in this way has divergent 
implications. On the one hand, it authorizes courts to review 
the decisions of religious institutions and authorizes courts to 
withhold church autonomy where they have determined that 
religious institutions have employed fraud or collusion. Moreo-
ver, it only grants autonomy to religious institutions where the 
nature of the parties, the relationship between the parties and 
the substance of the dispute provide sufficient indication that 
the members impliedly consented to the authority of the reli-
gious institution. Such proposals would undoubtedly meet with 
strong resistance from advocates of a robust version of church 
autonomy.  
At the same time, building church autonomy on an arbitra-
tion framework also discourages narrow constructions over 
which individuals are covered by doctrines like the ministerial 
exception. Once the surrounding factors justify a finding of im-
 
 338. See supra notes 13, 65–67 and accompanying text. 
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plied consent, then the autonomy of the religious institution is 
far reaching. Whether the member is a minister or a music 
teacher or a security guard, implied consent to the authority of 
a religious institution serves to empower the religious institu-
tion to make rules and adjudicate disputes that touch upon the 
religious life of the community. Attempts to differentiate be-
tween truly religious parties and those whose role is only of 
minor religious import are irrelevant once we recognize that 
the religious institution derives its authority from implied con-
sent; such consent provides institutional autonomy regardless 
of whether the plaintiff resembles a minister or not. 
In this way, understanding church autonomy as a constitu-
tionalized version of arbitration protects institutional autono-
my over religious life. Where the institutional rules and deci-
sions are truly the result of religious deliberation drawing on 
matters of faith and doctrine then the church’s autonomy is 
wide. Where those very same rules and decisions are based up-
on misconduct such as fraud or collusion then there can be no 
claim to implied consent and therefore no claim to religious au-
tonomy. Providing wide autonomy to sincere religious decision-
making, but withholding autonomy where such decision-
making is tainted by fraud or misconduct—this is the legacy of 
footnote four.  
 
 
